THE debate on peace talks with the militants is in a muddle. Much confusion surrounds the question of whether or not the government should engage in dialogue with the militants, and how it should behave if it does.

The militants do not get the same consideration. One reason could be the existing gaps in the scholarship on militants’ motives, operational capabilities and entrenchment in society.

While the pro-peace talks group believes dialogue with the militants is the only viable option, the rival camp is not convinced. It asserts that the option of dialogue is not going to work and the government will eventually have to pursue other measures.

Both arguments have their merits and flaws. But these cannot be effectively assessed without knowing the real strengths and weaknesses of the militants. An accurate assessment can help evolve rehabilitation strategies to reintegrate militants in society, which would be needed whether the choice is peace talks or use of force.

In Pakistan, violent extremist groups can be divided into four broad categories on the basis of their ideological, operational and structural commonalities.

The first category belongs to Kashmir-focused Pakistani militant groups, banned after 9/11. Most of these groups were transformed into charities or continued to operate under the cover of charities. These groups are also branded as classical militant groups.

The second category consists of tribal militants including the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-i-Islam, and the Gul Bahadur group etc.

Sectarian militant groups form the third category while breakaway factions of the classical militant groups and reactionary groups of urban youth, which emerged after 9/11 in reaction to the US invasion of Afghanistan and Pakistan’s alliance with the international counterterrorism coalition, fall in the fourth category. The militant groups belonging to the latter category are ethnically non-Pakhtun and are also described as the Punjabi Taliban.

Al Qaeda and other foreign groups based in Pakistan’s tribal areas are a separate category. In counterterrorism strategy, foreign groups are considered as catalyst factors that exploit the host country’s internal weakness through developing nexuses with local groups.

The groups belonging to each category behave differently. Even though the groups existing within a distinct category have varying attitudes, they mostly remain confined to specific structural boundaries of their wider category.

The classical militant groups and Pakistani Taliban have formal and strong organisational structures, as compared to the sectarian and Punjabi Taliban groups. Also, the former have more physical assets, which puts them at the risk of losing more as compared to the latter if the government decides to take strict measures against them.

Interestingly, a non-state actor’s accumulation of more resources has two kinds of impact. With an increase in its physical assets, a militant group could try to reorganise its operational wings along conventional military lines as in the case of Hezbollah in Lebanon. At the same time its political stakes expand, putting constraints on the use of its operational wings.

In our context, both Jamaatud Daawa and the TTP have the potential to develop along this particular pattern. However, it depends on how the state will conceive and respond to the threat that could emerge from this.

A review of the behaviour of militant groups would suggest that well-structured groups based in urban areas behave differently to those in tribal areas. Urban-based groups avoid engaging in local conflicts and mainly focus on external fronts. One reason is their ideological entrenchment and support base in society. At the same time, these groups fear physical losses in case they get involved in local conflicts. However, this approach does not help them avoid internal differences.

Small groups like the Punjabi Taliban and sectarian militant groups have nothing to lose as they have very fluid organisational structures with fewer human resources and less logistical dependence on major groups like Al Qaeda and the TTP. They continue fuelling the conflict with the help of allies in tribal territories. This is not unique to Pakistan; it can also be observed in Iraq, Yemen and Somalia.

Will Pakistan consider this diversity of militant groups in its counter strategies? Can it isolate small terrorist cells from major groups before initiating peace moves? Or can these small groups be engaged in the peace process and peace deals be made with them? The probability is not bright. It is not because of their fluid structure but the nature of their nexuses with Al Qaeda and the TTP.

Over time, the nexus of classical groups with Al Qaeda and other foreign groups has weakened. The classical groups support the Afghan Taliban but try to keep a distance from the Pakistani Taliban. Though they still have influence over individuals in the TTP and similar groups they cannot use it because of the TTP’s strong alliance with Al Qaeda.

The TTP will give more importance to its relations with Al Qaeda because of its operational, tactical and logistical linkages with foreign groups. Small terrorist groups have identical strong bonds with Al Qaeda, which indicates that Al Qaeda remains in the driving seat.

The probability of Pakistani militants disengaging from Al Qaeda depends on how the state can weaken the bond. Can this objective be achieved through talks or will a full-scale operation be required? This is a complex situation, where the scope of success of both talks and the use of force is difficult to measure.

One critical challenge in the aftermath of either initiative will be the militants’ rehabilitation. Does the state have any plan of reintegration of the militants?

After the successful military intervention in Swat, the state launched a rehabilitation programme in 2010. The rehabilitation centres have released more than 2,000 former militants, but thousands are waiting to be rehabilitated. Across the world, rehabilitation programmes are expensive and slow to produce results. Experts propose broader political approaches for reintegrating militants in society.

Counterterrorism scholars consider the negotiation process a viable option to neutralise the militants’ moral, ideological, political and tactical strengths. Through negotiations the nexus within different categories of the militants can be weakened and their support bases neutralised, but all depends on the government’s approach.