The global war on terrorism has not been won despite the lapse of eight years and a consensus is now emerging for the need to develop new strategies and approaches to neutralize terrorism. Afghanistan and Pakistan have once again become the focus of all the tried and revised approaches.
It is a critical juncture and a cause for concern for Pakistan that despite all its efforts and contributions against terrorism it is now being tagged as part of the problem. Military operations in Bajaur and Swat, aerial strikes by coalition forces in South and North Waziristan, killings and kidnapping of diplomats and foreigners in NWFP, mainly in Peshawar, and terrorist and suicide attacks across the country are pushing Pakistan to a position where it would be very difficult to convince the international community that the country can ameliorate the deteriorating situation in its territory. The international community and the US are not taking Pakistan’s continuous protests over the US and coalition forces’ strikes inside its tribal areas seriously. Moreover, the international community seems reluctant to invest in development projects in the tribal areas because of their experience in Afghanistan, where development in conflict areas did not bring the desired results.
The situation in Afghanistan is also becoming critical and more complicated where allied forces of 41 countries have failed to bring peace and prosperity. But the problem for Pakistan is that allied forces, western and American policymakers and the media are all blaming the situation in Afghanistan on Pakistan instead of paying more attention to Afghanistan’s internal dynamics of failed strategies.
Pakistan’s Role in War on Terror
After 9/11, the US sought Pakistan’s support in the global war against terrorism in view of the country’s proximity to Afghanistan. For the first time in its history, Pakistan deployed 120,000 troops on its western borders to capture and kill terrorists, and also provided logistic (air, sea and land) and intelligence facilities to the US to supply critical fuel, vehicles and aircraft to support the coalition troops in Afghanistan, and to target the terrorists. In return, Pakistan received more than US$ 10 billion in aid, mainly for military purposes.
Pakistan has clearly contributed more to the war against terrorism than any other coalition partner. Pakistan has arrested 1,250 Al-Qaeda suspects and killed more than 200, launched 12 major military operations against the Taliban in its territory and killed more than 3,000 and arrested over 2,000 militants including Afghan Taliban. Pakistan has paid a high price for its role in the international anti-terror effort as Pakistani security forces have suffered 1,750 casualties – twice the number of total casualties suffered by coalition forces of 41 countries in Afghanistan. Pakistan has also faced 650 terrorist attacks including 113 suicide attacks which killed around 5,000 people including civilians, paramilitary and police personnel.
But the worst two setbacks for Pakistan have been its participation in the anti-terror coalition in the face of popular opposition which bred anti-government sentiments; and the mistrust among the international community, particularly its coalition partners in the war on terror, of Islamabad. Pakistan has suffered from various forms and waves of terrorist activity since the 1980s – Khad and KGB terrorist activities inside Pakistan during the Afghan war – and the subsequent sectarian terrorism in the 1990s. The country has played a critical anti-terror role but its partners have harped on for it to “do more”. Being a US ally has caused major problems for the Pakistani government in owning the war against terrorism as its own war.
Strategy Failure
The situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is the outcome of the failed strategy of all the coalition partners. The major reason for the failure was the US strategic focus, which was based on ‘war’ as the primary response to perceived new global dangers, and lacked a larger conceptual framework. The strategy revolved around ‘pre-emptive strikes’ and US ‘internal security-centric’ approaches.
It ignored or did not prioritize the domestic/ regional implications and effects, due to which:
- Taliban reorganized their movement and strengthened their alliance with Al-Qaeda. They succeeded in establishing an ‘operational zone’ across the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
- Governance, security and development challenges in Afghanistan became more complex. Drug trafficking emerged as a new challenge.
- The mushroom growth of Taliban groups in Pakistan emerged as a bigger security threat and the phenomenon of Talibanization gripped not only the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) but also adjacent settled districts of Pakistan.
- Mistrust between the coalition partners prevailed and increased.
- Pak-US diplomatic ties became more coercive and the newly-elected democratic set up in Pakistan found itself in the throes of an inherited crisis.
The New Approaches
The failure of the strategy was realized very late, as the American focus shifted to Iraq. Pakistan tried to make the world realize in 2006 that the war in this region could not be won until a collective response approach was evolved, which should be based on an understanding of each other's political and social systems, cultures and values, and strategic interests. This approach was derived from the Iraq Study Group’s (ISG) report based on the regional initiative concept also conceived as a “new diplomatic offensive” to engage all local, regional and international stakeholders who have interest in Iraq.
Later, a similar approach was also suggested for Afghanistan to build genuine consensus on achieving Afghan stability by addressing the legitimate concerns of Pakistan's insecurity, with India, China, Russia, and Iran included in the negotiations to provide the necessary assurances. The approach grew further in April 2008, when Uzbek President Islam Karimov suggested adding NATO to the Six plus Two group on peace and stability in Afghanistan – the group included Iran, China, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, plus the United States and Russia, as guarantors. The Six plus Two group was set up in 1997 and had been effective until 2001. It drafted proposals on settling the political crisis in Afghanistan under UN auspices and arranged a meeting of the warring sides in Tashkent in July 1999, which led to the adoption of a declaration on guidelines for settling the conflict.
A major stumbling block to the formula was its composition, as the US and NATO had concerns over the involvement of Russia and Iran in the strategy and doubted the effectiveness of the group especially when a trilateral commission comprising Afghanistan, Pakistan and ISAF representatives was already functioning for that purpose. But the approach had the potential to blossom into a regional strategy.
Now another approach, a ‘grand bargain’, is under consideration in Washington. The notion of such an arrangement is also not new as it was first used in connection with Iran when it was advocated that Washington should provide security guarantees to Tehran, normalize bilateral ties, and develop a cooperative approach to regional security – that included Iraq and Afghanistan.
The newly-appointed US Central Command chief Gen. David Petraeus, who developed the new US counterinsurgency doctrine – which served him well in Iraq – subscribes to this idea. Reports suggest he is now blending this approach with his counterinsurgency doctrine.
It is important that all introduced approaches emphasize the need to take regional initiatives to resolve the issue of terrorism. Irrespective of which approach is eventually, it would now be difficult to risk adopting any non-regional approach to curb terrorism in the region. French President Nicolas Sarzoky urging differentiating between global terrorists and local insurgents groups, or Saudi efforts to detach Taliban from Al-Qaeda are moves in the same direction of regional initiatives. US President-elect Barack Obama has also referred to a more extended regional approach to address the issue when he stated that resolution of the Kashmir dispute is vital to enhancing Pakistan’s capabilities to fight terrorists.
The Local Approach
To make the regional approaches more comprehensive, it is imperative to evolve local approaches in line with the major regional strategy. Pakistan and Afghanistan can develop national strategies according to the ground realities. The responses should be sought at ideological, education, media & cultural, and legislation levels, and should be based on national consensus. Terrorist combat strategies should be formed according to the local political circumstances and must regard the cultural and religious values. There is need to prioritize the threat levels i.e.area to area, tribe to tribe, group to group and leader to leader. There is also need to make ‘local Jirga’ more effective and all leading stakeholders should protect each other’s strategic interests.
