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SouthAsiaNet - Pakistan
Swat: A Symptom of a Deeper, Older Malady


Safdar Sial & Aqeel Yusafzai

Published: November 16, 2006


The idyllic valley of Swat, one of Pakistan’s main tourist attractions, has over the last six months turned into a theatre of insurgency by religious extremists. Led by Maulana Fazlullah, a village cleric and a leader of the ‘banned’ Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM), armed militants demanding enforcement of Sharia laws are taking on Pakistan’s paramilitary and regular army troops. There have been at least 63 terrorist attacks in Swat region since July this year, including six suicide bombings and numerous public beheadings. Most of these attacks—39 till November 15, to be precise—were targeted at the security forces, killing 97 security personnel and injuring another 127 (PIPS Database: Table I). The number of militants and other civilians killed in the fighting runs into hundreds as the Pakistan Army has moved in to quell the pro-Taliban movement, which has taken control of six sub-divisions in the district of Swat.

In addition, the violence has forced thousands of people to flee their homes. PIPS sources say that about 60 per cent of the 1.5 million Swat valley inhabitants have left the area. Hounded, on the one hand, by the Taliban and vulnerable to military strikes on the other, they have either taken refuge with their relatives or moved to other cities like Mardan, Buner, Peshawar, Rawalpindi and Karachi. Kidnapping of civil and armed government officials as well as civilians opposed to Talibanisation has become a norm. The Swat insurgency has undermined the state’s writ to such an extent that General Pervez Musharraf cited it as one of the reasons behind his November 3 decision to impose emergency in the country. But, so far, neither the use of force by the state nor mediation by a local jirga seems to rein in Fazlullah’s militants. 

Background
This is not the first time that a Sharia movement has risen in Swat and Malakand regions. Similar uprisings by TNSM were seen in the mid and late 1990s. Then led by Maulana Sufi Mohammed, more famous for leading thousands of jihadis to death in Afghanistan in the wake of U.S. attacks in 2001, TNSM was able to get concessions from both the Benazir and Nawaz Sharif governments. A gradual process of Talibanisation has since been taking place in this predominantly Pashtun region.

The latest movement, however, has been triggered by a more recent event. It was during the Lal Masjid Operation in Islamabad earlier this year that the Imam Dehri cleric, Maulana Fazlullah, came into action. His FM radio station, which the government inexplicably allowed to broadcast freely, was instrumental in galvanising the local population against the government. He extended full support to the Lal Masjid clerics. As many of the Red Mosque students were also from this area, the brutal army action in Islamabad generated sympathy for Fazlullah’s cause. Most of the rallies and anti-government demonstrations to protest the Red Mosque operation were held in this region.

When the Red Mosque operation started on July 3, the government put Swat, Mingora, Dir and Malakand areas on high security alert. The very next day, militants began attacking police and other government officials in Swat district and killed two policemen and four others. Soon Maulana Fazlullah asked his supporters to take up arms against the government to avenge the action against Red Mosque and carry out suicide attacks. Three more policemen were killed in Mingora on July 12 when two suspected suicide bombers rammed an explosive-laden car into a police vehicle.

The security situation in Swat continued to deteriorate after July as the militants kept on targeting security forces and police stations. The range of targets soon widened. The local Taliban also began to target pro-government tribal elders, civil government officials, music and video shops, barber shops, internet cafes, NGOs, foreigners, girls’ schools, Buddha’s image, and government buildings and residences. The pretext of attacking all these different targets, according to the Sharia movement leader (and his followers in the region), is that they spread and support ‘un-Islamic’ ways.

The rationale behind this wave of militancy, according to Fazlullah, is that “the government, its security forces, pro-government people and others who support the American cause are acting against Islam”. Music and video shops, barber shops, girls’ schools and NGOs are means of spreading obscenity and vulgarity which are not allowed in an Islamic system. Other than the band of militants, Fazlullah also runs a ‘Shura’, or a council, of clerics as well as a Shura of tribal elders. Both back his plans of instituting an Ssharia-based legal system and enforcing a moral and social code of Islamic behaviour.

Chronology of Conflict
Given the rise and escalation in militant activity for Talibanisation, a military operation in Swat became imminent in the beginning of October. By then, a volunteer Taliban force of the Imam Dehri Centre was patrolling and controlling many areas of the Swat district. They were seen moving in groups, armed with light and heavy weapons, spreading terror in bazaars. In addition to the ubiquitous Kalashnikovs, these militants are armed rocket-launchers, RPG-7 rockets and other sophisticated weapons. They would visit mosques to make announcements on loudspeaker, urging the populace to take their disputes for resolution to the Imam Dehri Centre to get Sharia justice.

On October 8, a Taliban leader announced in Jamia Mosque Nokhara that the police system has been replaced by Islamic justice and that they would do the policing according to the Sharia. On the same day, to back up their claims, the Taliban stationed a fleet of 14 vehicles, carrying fully armed militants, in different areas of the district.

On October 9, Maulana Fazlullah announced the formation of a volunteer force to “control law and order and traffic problems” in Matta tehsil. He said that a Sharia court had already been set up in his native Imam Dehri village. The volunteer force was called ‘Shaheen Commandos’. They started patrolling the area and marched through Matta and Kabal towns. Fifteen vehicles mounted with machineguns led the march. Eyewitnesses said that the volunteers were making announcements advising the people to lodge complaints on two cell-phone numbers displayed at different mosques.

On October 10, more than 250 armed Taliban were also seen patrolling in Mingora, Khwazakhela and other areas of Swat. They went to different bazaars and gave Islamic instructions to people. In Fizza Gutt Taliban destroyed the posters bearing pictures of women.

Three men were publicly flogged on October 12 after a ‘Shura’ set up by Maulana Fazlullah found them guilty of abetting the abduction of two women. The sentence awarded by the ‘Shura’ was carried out in Imam Dehri after Friday prayers, amid slogans of “Allah-o-Akbar” raised by hundreds of people who had gathered to witness the spectacle. Maulana Fazlullah said the sentence would be a lesson to all criminals who should now mend their ways. The volunteer force organized by the cleric had set up a large stage on which the three alleged criminals were flogged. One of the ‘convicts’, Bukhtiar, was flogged 30 times; another, Shamroz Khan, 25 times and Mohammad Sher 15 times.

On October 17, a high-level meeting in Islamabad co-chaired by President Musharraf and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz discussed ‘the deteriorating law and order situation in parts of the frontier province’. The government deployed more troops in the Swat on October 24 to quell the growing militancy. On October 18, a fierce suicide attack in Mingora Police Lines killed at least 30 policemen and injured another 35. Till that time attacks on paramilitary forces, police stations and FC posts had become a routine matter.

Meanwhile, Maulana Fazlullah time and again claimed that he and his comrades espoused peace and wanted enforcement of the Sharia. He argued that his volunteer force had to step in to check the deteriorating law and order situation after the police withdrew from the area and confined themselves to the district headquarters of Mingora. He said that the government had deliberately withdrawn police from checkpoints to shift the blame of worsening law and order on to his ‘peaceful’ followers.

The October-25 suicide attack pushed the government to take immediate action. Severe clashes between Fazlullah’s followers and security forces started on October 26 between Imam Dehri militants and the security forces as the militants beheaded six security personnel in public at Shakkardarra near Mingora.

The Military Responds
Police and other paramilitary forces were increasingly becoming ineffective in checking the advance of Fazlullah’s forces. Indeed, in many instances, they were either retreating or surrendering to the militants. The spectacular beheadings carried out by the militants upped the ante. It put the military-led government under pressure and the army had to act decisively.

When General Musharraf declared emergency rule on November 3, he had cited the demoralization of security forces and mounting insurgency in Swat as a justification. Intelligence agencies were also reporting the presence of ‘outsiders’ among the ranks of militants. There is also a strong belief in government circles that Fazlullah is no longer in effective command of all the fighters active in Swat and that the movement has taken on new, wider dimensions.

By the time the military was sent out to tackle the militants, out of eight tehsils in Swat district the militants had taken control of six—Kabal, Matta, Khwazakhela, Charbagh, Madyan and Kalam. By the first week of November, they had started to move into the bordering Shangla district as well. On November 12, the Pakistan Army started its operation in Swat and Shangla. During the first three days of military strikes and clashes with the militants, 90 people were killed and dozens others injured. Nine soldiers were also among the dead and 14 were injured.

The ongoing fighting between the armed followers of Maulana Fazlullah and Pakistan security forces has forced thousands of people in Swat and Shangla valleys of North West Pakistan to flee their homes. According to local sources about  Villagers trapped in the fighting zone take advantage of timely ceasefire or halt in fighting and shift to safer places abandoning the crops, ready for the harvest, in their fields. Swat’s economy, heavily dependent on tourism, is also suffering blows (like its people) due to the fighting.

Besides the threats of security operations and clashes, the local Taliban and TNSM militants have also been a factor for causing such a massive displacement. They are reportedly searching for the people who are opposed to their religious ideals and are harassing them. Pro-government tribal people and even the local journalist are under Maulana Fazlullah’s threats. The local people who feel insecure in Maulana’s kingdom have either to support him or to leave the area.

But it does not mean that the locals are supporting the security operations by the Pakistan Army. There is a common perception there that jihadis want to create another Waziristan in settled areas of the troubled province and the security operations would help them. The people fear that there will be bloodshed and more displacements once the government accelerates the regular army operation in the region to reassert its writ.

Al-Qaeda, Others Join the Fray? 
Does Maulana Fazlullah enjoy full and complete control over his two Shuras (councils)? Do the different bands of fighters, collectively known as the Taliban or Mujahideen, remain under his sway and obey his command? These questions are critical in the context of future peace and security in the region and in determining the outcome of the ongoing conflict. Apparently, some of these fighters seem disciplined and under the command of Fazlullah and his many deputies such as Maulana Shah Dowran, Serajuddin and Muslim Khan. But there are many others who call themselves Tehreek Islamia Taliban and are even more radical and inflexible in their approach than Fazlullah’s force.

There are also reports that Jaish-e-Muhammad’s splinter group Jamaatul Furqan and al-Qaeda militants are also supporting Imam Dehri activists against the security forces. Militants of Jamaatul Furqan had set up check-posts on the main road in Shakkardarra and took positions on hills during the recent clashes. They also seized four men during the checking of vehicles. According to local people of Swat there are many new faces in the area that they do not recognize.

Some recent news reports suggest that al-Qaeda may also be supporting TNSM militants in Swat. This support may come in two forms: finances and by brining in fresh recruits from the tribal region. “I can tell you there is money coming from al-Qaeda and if al-Qaeda did not lead those things we could not fight. It is not just in Swat or in Waziristan or in Bajaur. We are getting stronger every where in the area”, Abdul Samad, a stocky militant from Afghanistan, was quoted as saying. Samad, a militant organizer, has also said that he travelled in recent weeks to North Waziristan and recruited score of militants to reinforce Fazalullah’s followers in Swat. (Daily Times, Islamabad, November 3, 2007) Squeezed, stretched and on the run in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas, it is quite conceivable that al-Qaeda militants may be infiltrating the ranks of Fazlullah’s fighters. They want a territory from where they can orchestrate their worldwide operations and a troubled Swat may just be the place for them.

Whether or not al-Qaeda is involved in Swat, there is no dearth of indoctrinated local fighters. In this context, the TNSM’s role in the ongoing Swat crisis is intriguing. Its founder, Maulana Sufi Muhammad, who is also the father-in-law of Maulana Fazlullah, has distanced himself from the happenings in Swat and expelled Fazlullah from his organization. The latter, however, is insisting that he is still part of the TNSM and has been citing support for his cause among the Swati cadres of the organization as evidence that he cannot be expelled. Sufi Muhammad has been in jail for the last six years in Dera Ismail Khan (recently shifted to Peshawar for medical treatment) and has refused to apply for bail. He was arrested after returning from Afghanistan, where he headed a group of more than 10,000 armed men to fight for the Taliban against the invading US forces and its allies from the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance.

Fazlullah, too, was in the Sufi Muhammad-led Lashkar, which lost an unspecified number of men in the fighting, while many others were subsequently freed after paying huge amounts as ransom to Afghan warlords. Fazlullah spent 15 months in the Central Prison, Dera Ismail Khan, with his ageing father-in-law before being released on bail. It is improbable that Sufi Muhammad would disown his disciple and son-in-law and his statements seem to be tactical moves to keep his leadership going and secure his future role in the region if Fazlullah is decimated.

The wave of militancy in Swat is also inspired by Baitullah Mehsud and other pro-Taliban militants in Waziristan. Maulana Fazalullah is replicating their tactics in Swat. Much like Mehsud, he is defiant, calls for the imposition of Shariah, wants the army out of Swat, and seeks the establishment of a Shariah Bench in Malakand and withdrawal of cases against himself and his supporters. These are the conditions they have laid down for a return of normalcy to the region, echoing the demands made by the Taliban of Waziristan.

The Role of the Jirga
Swat is a deeply religious area. Even if the people may be divided on whether to support Fazlullah, they are almost unanimous in their support for Shariah. The Malakand Shariah Qaumi Jirga, comprising representatives of political parties like the Pakistan People’s Party (Parliamentarian), PPP-Sherpao, the Jamaat-e-Islami, the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (F), the Awami National Party and traders’ bodies, also support Sharia rule for Malakand.

This Jirga, however, neither supports the army operation nor violent militancy in Swat. The Malakand peace jirga has recently decided to hold multi-party conferences in the region from Nov 21 to mobilize public opinion and to pressure the government to resolve the crisis through negotiations. This was announced during a meeting in Chakdarra on November 15. The meeting, called by Senator Maulana Gul Naseeb Khan, was attended by ulema, political leaders and local government representatives from Lower Dir, Upper Dir, Swat, Buner, Shangla and Malakand Agency.

A sub-committee of the jirga met with both the caretaker chief minister of the NWFP and Maulana Fazlullah. The government was unwilling to accept Fazalullah’s demands, and the Jirga also found the provincial caretaker set up powerless to take any decision. The Jirga has thus decided to convene an all-party conference on Nov 21 in Malakand agency. The conference would then be taken to Lower Dir on November 22, Upper Dir on November 23, and to Buner and Mingora on the following days.

The Jirga has also decided to send a delegation to legislators from the region, such as Amir Muqam, Bakht Baidar Khan and Sayyed Muhammad Ali Shah Bacha to inform the government about the wishes of the people of Malakand. They have also urged the army chief and the corps commander of Peshawar to immediately suspend military operation in Swat and Shangla and initiate negotiations. At the same time, Maulana Fazlullah has been asked to identify the ‘enemies’ in his ranks and take stern action against them.

The Roots of Pashtun Extremism
The socio-economic, political and cultural conditions, which have provided fertile ground for the extremists to further their agenda, are a direct consequence of successive Pakistani government’s policies. The lack of a credible and continuous political process, denying the people the right to participate in policymaking, has given room to fringe ideologies to take hold in these areas. Economic backwardness, the absence of a proper educational system and a general attitude of neglect towards these ‘far flung’ areas have cultivated and exacerbated these people’s sense of alienation from the state.

Equally significant has been the state of policy of recruiting local population for the jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s, a trend that Islamabad’s sudden policy U-turn in 2001 could not reverse. Political disenfranchisement, persistent poverty and a culture of encouraging jihad have meant that the organisations like TNSM hold sway in these areas. For years, these groups have freely collected funds, run madrasas and organised militias to serve the so-called strategic interests of the country. In Swat, as in FATA and other places in the country, the state of Pakistan is fighting its own creations. Pakistan is reaping what its policymakers had sowed in their zeal to defeat the godless Soviet Union and a pagan India.

The Way Ahead
In the short term, the government has to follow a two-track approach. What is needed at present is a combination of the military approach and political reconciliation, perhaps through the Jirga. Use of force without a parallel process of reconciliation can further provoke the people and raise the intensity of anti-government feelings. The people of Swat (and NWFP and FATA) are already in a state psychological distress due to the seemingly endless and indiscriminate violence. In these circumstances they are more likely to align themselves with the Taliban-like elements.

In the long term, sustained and sincere efforts are required to engage the people of these areas in a political process. Islamabad will have to shift its policy focus and devise plans to ameliorate the economic plight of the people of these areas. Instead of madrasas, formal secular education ought to be promoted aggressively and universally.

All that, however, will take an unprecedented display of vision and political will on the part of Pakistan’s civil and military decision makers. Unfortunately, given their past and recent history, they seem incapable of revising and reforming their ways. Even if this ongoing conflict in Swat is somehow resolved temporarily, it is unlikely to be the last bastion of extremism and violence in the country. The conflict will get bloodier and uglier than ever and will probably go on for generations to come.

(Attacks on security forces and casualties in Swat: July 1 to November 15, 2007)
 
 
 

   
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