Already struggling for stability, security and peace, neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan can afford to sink further into militancy and conflict. The Taliban insurgency and border security are two major and interconnected issues that have had an impact on security and the political situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Both countries are struggling to revive bilateral engagements for evolving joint and regional frameworks to manage border security, counterterrorism, and political reconciliation with the Afghan Taliban. The authors argue that the political reconciliation with the Mullah Omar-led Taliban and exit of international forces from Afghanistan would not resolve all problems related to border security, militancy and terrorism and the two countries in particular and the wider region in general would still face threats from the groups that seek to enforce their own versions of Islamic law and have a global jihadist agenda. Pakistan and Afghanistan have many compelling reasons to perceive and jointly respond to the diverse challenges to their respective but interlinked security and stability. However, it would not be an easy and smooth process to evolve a common perspective.

There are many factors for the rise in violence in South Asian countries, including human security deficit, want and fear syndrome, a state-centric approach, local conflicts combining with international ones and confusing ethnic and ideological matters with religious considerations. The culture of not challenging the violent discourse is the real problem in creating an intolerant society. One of the most important ways to fight the culture of violence is to demonstrate the importance of respect for diversity and pluralism and the benefits to society of developing a culture of religious freedom. What civil society can do to challenge and reduce the appeal of violent extremism has come to the fore in recent years. The role of civil society organizations in South Asian countries in countering extremism and terrorism can be significantly increased by enhancing their capacity and empowerment and by them focusing on empirically assessed needs and typology of the interventions required for that purpose in their respective countries.

Opinion polls demonstrate that American foreign policies or actions, particularly the perceived US-Israel nexus, have significantly contributed to a rise in anti-Americanism in the Middle East. The American culture however is not that much a factor in this sentiment since the US is still the style icon for the Middle East, and it still attracts a large number of Arab immigrants. It is also significant that anti-Americanism is about the only common ground or agenda that the masses in the Middle East share with the Islamists. There is a theory of there being a tendency on the part of various Arab Muslim regimes to allow anti-Americanism to flourish as a means to demonstrate to their people that the regime is not an American ‘puppet.’ It certainly seems otherwise in Pakistan today. The anti-Americanism has not appeared all of a sudden among the Pakistani populace, but has been a gradual process; anti-Americanism has arguably been a constant feature of Pakistani politics, but the widespread anti-American sentiment currently prevailing amongst the population is a phenomenon best explained in the context of Pakistani leadership’s support for the US-led war on terror.

Pakistan needs to learn from how soft approaches for both deradicalization and counter-radicalization in world rely on and engage clergy. Religious scholars and clerics not only lead the prevalent larger religious discourse in Pakistan but in most cases the public’s views resonate with those held by the clergy in the political, socio-cultural, economic and other areas, both in terms of national and international perspectives. At first, the government will have to ensure security for religious scholars so that they can work independently and without fear in state-led deradicalization programs. At present, there are extensive threats to those moderate religious scholars across Pakistan who raise their voice against the militants and acts of terrorism. Secondly, Pakistan should guide, encourage and support religious scholars vis-à-vis their role in countering radicalization and extremism. Thirdly, Pakistan should evolve a comprehensive deradicalization program borne out of political and institutional consensus. The role of religious scholars in such a program can comprise different elements including counseling, re-education, dialogue and creation of counter-extremism arguments to disengage militants from violent groups and ideologies.

After Pakistan gained independence from British rule, Iran was the first country to recognize it. Both countries signed a number of important trade treaties in the 1950s and ’60s. However, bilateral ties have ebbed in the last three decades over issues ranging from security to politics and sectarian belief. This report is based on the findings of a survey of mainstream religious and political parties in Pakistan to assess their views on Islamabad’s ties with Iran. The survey notes that the political and religious parties in Pakistan have considerable convergence of opinion on the shape that Pak-Iran relations should take. There is a general agreement that Pakistan’s ties with Iran should be determined by national interest and not by the dictates of the US or any other country. The political parties support by and large Iran’s right to pursue a peaceful nuclear program. However, with the exception of some religious political parties, there is substantial opposition to Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. The survey finds clear consensus that Pakistan and Iran should work together because many of the challenges that confront them are shared and because a collaborative approach would lead to more concrete impact.