What is Real in Pak-US Relations?

Safdar Sial

The cold war and communist threats, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the ongoing war on terror have been three key milestones in Pak-US relationship since the establishment of Pakistan. All of these strategic interests were deep fabricated in the US policy and none of these was entirely a Pakistani interest although their consequences might have some direct implications for security and stability of Pakistan. But Pakistan pursued and safeguarded these interests in the region more actively than even the United States. On the other hand there have been some other ‘landmarks’ in history, which were entirely related to Pakistan’s security (the wars of 1965 and 1971 etc) and where the US response had been imbedded in laxity and indifference.

In terms of gains, Pakistan has mainly got the monetary and military benefits whereas the US has always secured its strategic interests in the region throughout the highs and lows of Pak-US relationship. The monetary benefits, and some strategic benefits Pakistan got as a corollary of developments during and after cold war and Afghan war, become less important when viewed through lens of their fallouts. However, military aids and military pacts helped strengthen defense of Pakistan. Pakistan military itself has been a potent factor in retaining the alliance with the US. This had its own implications, which have become now more visible in form of weak state and political institutions, and mutilated democracy.

One more thing, which has become increasingly real in Pak-US relations, is the influence of Americans in Pakistan’s internal affairs. Having been engaged in war on terror with the General (retd) Pervez Musharraf for about 7 years, the United States feels now uncomfortable with the new political government in Pakistan. The US brought tremendous pressure on the coalition government not to pursue the restoration of judges or the impeachment of the former president, who resigned on 18 August to avoid impeachment. Senior US diplomats and flag officers paid frequent visits to their Pakistani counterparts with the same message: Don’t rock the boat.

Awash with economic crises and crumpled under heaps of foreign and local debts, Pakistan has mostly pursued a policy of monetary gains in Pak-US course of relations. Perhaps these monetary and military temptations kept so occupied our ruling and military elites that it became a basic principle of our foreign policy. To get aids, loans and grants from international organizations and countries, and get them reshuffled again and again has remained a prime strategic interest of Pakistan. The success story of Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani’s recent visit to the US was also narrated in media in monetary tones: “According to a joint communiqué issued after a meeting between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani late July, the United States will provide $115.5 million in food security assistance to Pakistan, including $42.5 million over the next nine months. The statement also supported a move in the US Senate to provide $15 billion to Pakistan over 10 years.”

And obviously the American interests in war on terror did not go implicit completely, some were made part of the official agreement: “The two leaders agreed to strengthen long-term security relationship with a view to enhancing Pakistan’s defence capabilities, especially in the field of counter-terrorism, through training and equipment. They also vowed to strengthen the Tripartite Commission between the International Security Assistance Force, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Support the efforts of Pakistan and Afghanistan to hold the next joint jirga this autumn.”

Meanwhile the White House has reminded Pakistan recently that it has an “international obligation” to fight terrorism, and besides protecting its own people it also has an obligation to protect its neighbours. The White House fact sheet, issued after a meeting between Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and President George W. Bush, reflects a marked changed from previous US statements on this issue which named Afghanistan as the neighbouring state threatened by terrorism emanating from Pakistan’s tribal areas. Diplomatic observers in Washington say that by not naming the neighbouring states, the White House has indicated that it also expects Pakistan to help prevent terrorist attacks in India which has experienced a series of bomb blasts recently, killing dozens of people.

Pakistan and the US have, to a greater extent, disparate visions on how to tackle Taliban and al-Qaeda. The new political government in Pakistan, which had taken hold of state affairs after February 2008 elections, has not yet mapped out any strategy on war on terror. As the US diplomats and leaders have been trying to take into confidence the ruling political elite and the Pakistan military on American interests in war on terror, the Pentagon and the CIA have been harping on the same string of chasing al-Qaeda inside Pakistan in the recent months. The ongoing disarray among Pakistan's new civilian leadership, including its refusal to accept a U.S. military training mission for the Pakistani army [particularly after killing of 11 FC personnel in a US air strike inside Pakistani tribal areas on June 11], has led to intense frustration within the Pentagon and reignited a debate over whether the U.S. should act on its own against extremists operating in Pakistan's northwestern tribal regions. The US military officials believe Pakistan has been unable to control the Taliban militants in tribal belt who have increased their cross-border attacks on Nato forces inside Afghanistan.

And Pakistan’s bargaining leverage rests on its geostrategic significance with special reference to war on terror, energy-hub Central Asia and China [factors]. At the same time Pakistani tribal areas have also become a dangerous conflict zone. This is, to most security and strategist analysts, a direct fallout of Pakistan’s pursuing US policies in the region since Afghan war. Keep aside the monetary benefits and see what has Pakistan got to reap in terms of strategic interests? According to US president George Bush the biggest challenge for the next president of the US would be Pakistan and not Iraq or even Afghanistan, according to a report in the US News and World report on July 7. Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staffs, also spoke in July this year of greater number of insurgents and foreign fighters crossing from Pakistan, “unmolested and unhindered”, and warned: “This movement has to stop”. There were even reports that US commandoes are ready to conduct raids inside Pakistan. And according to US intelligence reports, al-Qaeda network is spreading rapidly in Pakistan’s north western region where recent peace agreements permitted militants to increase their terrorist camps to over 100; till summer of 2007 there were 29 camps in Waziristan only.

Pakistan’s image as a ‘terrorist state’ has repelled the global investors besides weakening the diplomatic ties with countries. The country is facing a fiercest spree of suicide attacks from militants and also cross-border attacks from Afghanistan. As many as twelve (12) cross-border attacks were reported in last 4 years that killed more than 114 persons including 13 soldiers. The social fabric of the country is badly being blotted by radicalization and extremism. The political instability and economic decay has mired the fundamentals of prosperity and development. Our indigenous agriculture and industry segments have receded to verge of sinking into an abyss of non-existence. This is the situation on ground. But our current account deficit requires another billions of dollars and this still remains our ‘real’ strategic interest. Nonetheless, the United States is still present in Afghanistan and war on terror may not come to an end for another decade or two. That is also a ‘real’ strategic concern of the US. Lets see for whom these ‘real strategic concerns’ have constructive interference and who faces the fallout. Hopes should also be raised that it becomes beneficial for the both.

Related Stories:

1. Pak-US: A Balance Sheet of Relations