PIPS - Pakistan Institute For Peace Studies (SouthAsiaNet-PAKISTAN)

SOUTHASIANET - PAKISTAN

Dated: 17-04-2008

Talks with BLA: Hoping against the Hope

Khuram Iqbal

A ray of hope for peace has emerged in insurgency-hit Balochistan after the historical February elections in Pakistan. The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) that came out victorious in elections tendered an apology to Balochistan on behalf of the people of Pakistan. The leadership of mainstream political parties also signaled to talk even to people “who have gone to mountains” i.e. Baloch militant groups, to end the insurgency. All the major Baloch nationalist parties responded positively and demonstrated their willingness for a peaceful resolution of the Balochistan’s multifaceted problem by welcoming the apology. But the issue got a new twist on 9 April 2008 when Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), the most prominent militant group, rejected the government’s offer for talks, saying it was not ready even to consider it.

Since peace in Balochistan is crucial for the overall stability, security and prosperity of Pakistan, some questions need to be addressed in order to formulate a comprehensive and flawless strategy for a stable peace in the province.

Is there any negotiable issue to engage BLA into dialogue?

Many believe that the dialogue process in Balochistan is likely to succeed if the government is able to reinforce insurgents’ trust into political process for a durable solution of Balochistan’s problems. However it seems highly unlikely that the BLA would be agreed to negotiate on anything less than an “independent socialist Balochistan”. The BLA in its foundations is a separatist organization. Formed in 1974 by a Marxist Sardar, Khair Bakhsh Marri, the outfit vows to undertake an armed struggle for a separate state of Balochistan with a socialist system.

Moreover, the BLA has experienced radical shifts in its policies and objectives in the last few years. During the course of time the outfit has evolved as a transnational entity that maintains strong relationships with foreign terrorist groups like People Resistance Movement of Iran (Previously known as Jundullah-Iran). At present group’s wider strategy involves the creation of “Greater Balochistan” comprising Afghan, Iranian and Pakistani parts of Balochistan. The BLA has also influenced other armed groups in Balochistan to expend their strategy and gain “independence from the forced occupation of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran”. These other groups like Balochistan Republican Army (BRA) and Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) have also transformed into separatists. Unlike nationalist parties’ active in Balochistan, their demands are no more limited to all the “autonomy minus defense, currency, communications and foreign affairs” but province’s alienation from the federation. Can government negotiate with BLA on the basis of a demand for a separate Balochistan?

Who to Talk with?

Though, deprived of a popular support in the province, a dominating majority of BLA’s foot soldiers are mainly from Marri and Bugti tribes who take oath of allegiance for tribal loyalty and not necessarily committed to the cause of “Greater Balochistan”. Hence, for a successful peace process in Balochistan, there is a need to neutralize the extremist/separatist segment of BLA’s leadership. A little is known about the leadership of BLA. Pakistani authorities believe that Balach Marri, the son of Khair Bakhsh Marri was heading the group until he died in a military operation in November 2007. At present, Barahamdag Bugti is believed to be the head of BLA after the demise of Balach Marri. It merits mentioning here that after the death of Nawab Akbar Bugti in August 2006, hundreds of armed men from Bugti militia joined hands with their arch rivals, the Marris, to fight against a common enemy (the government of Pakistan).

BLA needs a ‘clandestine’ signal to enter into talks

Pakistan's building of its first strategically and economically significant deep-sea port at Gwadar is being negatively viewed by the Indians. In January 2008, Indian Naval Chief stated that Pakistan’s building of Gwadar port has “serious strategic implications for India”. For the very reasons, Indian intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) is believed to be supporting and funding the activities of BLA to create hindrances in the construction of Gwadar port. In January 2005 Pakistani intelligence agencies submitted a report to government, which revealed that RAW, has set up a “Special Operations Division” (SOD) in Balochistan that was assigned the task of creating troubles for the Chinese engineers. The report also disclosed that SOD is providing Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) weapons that are manufactured in Afghanistan.

While inviting BLA for talks, the newly elected government of Balochistan must understand that the BLA is not an indigenous movement but an armed group operating on the behest of foreign powers. Legitimacy of the purposed talks with BLA will be open to numerous questions since the group was officially declared, terrorist by the Pakistani and British governments in 2006.

Needless to say, the government’s offer to initiate dialogue with Baloch nationalist parties, the true representatives of Balochs, is likely to produce positive outcomes. However, the prospect of engaging BLA into dialogue doesn’t seem practical. The outfit has never shown any political credentials that are necessary to engage in talks. By rejecting government’s recent offer for talks, BLA has closed all doors for the dialogue with the provincial and federal government. Henceforth, talks with right-minded politicians must take place and the government must demonstrate political will to address the problems faced by Balochistan. The BLA, if sincere with a peaceful resolution of the years old conflict, must understand the new political realities in the province where the elected representatives are exploring ways to address the valid grievances of the people living in Balochistan.

(Khuram Iqbal is a Research Analyst at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He was previously a senior researcher at Pak Institute for Peace Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan.)