By Ranga Kalansooriya and Namal Perera

The much talked-about ceasefire (CFA) of Sri Lanka officially ends today (January 16) at 7.00pm. It was signed on Feb 22, 2002. At least 200 militants and six army men have been killed since the decision to scrap the six year-old Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) was taken by the government on January 2, according to the military sources.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), one of the most ruthless and sophisticated terrorist outfits in the world, agreed to implement a ceasefire with the then government aiming at reaching a negotiated political settlement to the country’s protracted conflict. Eight rounds of talks were held in different capitals in the world and there were many plus and minus outcomes during the process.

There had been mixed – both positive and negative – factors in the CFA and its controversial process. In fact, as in the case of any other peace process, it saved lives and money to the country.

The major positive factor of the process was that it marked the longest silent period of war – though the troubles recommenced by the beginning of 2005, both sides made their fullest attempts to stick to the agreement in its early period.  However, the LTTE was accused of many targeted killings those included intelligence officers and some senior military officials and political figures during this period. However, according to rough estimates, at least 10,000 lives were saved per annum, through the implementation of the CFA.

The LTTE, for the first time in its history, was actively engaged in a process of internal democratization and also a serious peace process through documentations and negotiations. Internationally renowned academics conducted training sessions on democracy, good governance and English language to senior Tigers in Wanni jungles during the first phase of the process. Also it came up with some comprehensive political documents including the historic Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA) that proposed an interim autonomous administrative arrangement to the Tiger held areas of the North and East of Sri Lanka. Some are of the view that the splinter group of Karuna within the ranks of the LTTE was a by-product of this internal democratization process.

The country saw a clear booming of its economy during the first three years of the process, especially in the areas of tourism, investment and trade. The fastest growing in the country was the North, according to the World Bank and Central Bank statistics. The defence budget of the country which was sky-rocketing increase for over two decades, took a remarkable down-turn. The negative growth that recorded in 2001 made a drastic U turn. The Colombo Stock Exchange recorded the world’s second fastest growth in 2002.

The international community was active through the Norwegian brokerage of the process. The Scandinavian peace monitors were on the field to get the first hand accounts of the events. This was strategically important to keep a stable momentum and also to ‘trap’ both parties in the process.

The process attracted many donor contributions to the country. USD 4.5 billion pledges were awaiting the establishment of a meaningful peace in the country.

As we saw in East Timor, the Tsunami was not a blessing in guise in establishing peace in Sri Lanka. Though it created a room for both parties to work together, the opportunity was lost. Nevertheless, the ceasefire was a facilitator and a great asset for the post-tsunami rehabilitation work, though the proposed long term post-tsunami working arrangement (PTOMS) was nullified by the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka.

Free movement of people between the North and South took place after almost two decades though the opening of A9 highway with the signing of CFA. This opened doors for people to people contact between the two parts of the country, and also access to resources in many fronts.

The democracy was strengthened through many aspects. Media had better access to different sources, opportunities were opened to question the LTTE and other parties on child recruitment, human rights violations etc, thanks to the CFA. Efforts were taken to disarm many para-militaries and other groups, was another significant step.

Negative Factors

The ceasefire agreement was not a result of a long negotiated preparatory process. Therefore, it created many operational issues that demanded urgent impractical solutions. Such complications drew both parties to non-ending deadlocks. The best example was the issue with regard to High Security Zones (HSZ).

Some key individuals of the peace process worked according to personal agendas which were detrimental to the process in the long-term. The then government was not a strong entity in ruling out arbitrary decisions by the then Executive President who was against the ruling party. Both President and the Prime Minister were having extremely distasteful working relationship where one was working and manoeuvring against the other. This would have been a golden opportunity in reaching consensus in the Southern polity where both major political parties were in power, but the personal politics played against it.

Also attitudes and influences of some key negotiators worked against the ultimate goal of the process. One of the government negotiators took steps to conduct a meeting of CFA Co-chairs in Washington DC where the participation of the LTTE was in question due to the USA’s ban on the organization. This created the beginning of the fall of the CFA.

The involvement of the international community was not professionally handled. The Southern populace was not comfortable with major involvements of the West. Also the Indian factor was not happy with ‘too many cooks playing around at her back-yard.’

The ceasefire itself had no major focus of the future and did not have a parallel political process to deal with key issues. It had a process to monitor the violations but not a mechanism to secure the smooth implementations of the agreement.

Also the entire marketing strategy of the peace process was a failure. The economic and social benefits of the process were not filtered down to the grass roots of the masses.
Another significant failure was with regard to the ownership of the process. It was limited to a select class of society. There was less room in the CFA for other stake-holders of the conflict to intervene which made them radical opponents to the process. This also led to seek legal challenges against the process which were extremely detrimental.


Future Perspective after Jan 16

Some are of the view that the abolition of the CFA could be considered an attempt to ‘all out war.’ The government has openly claimed, even before abolition of CFA that it will capture the Tiger stronghold by August this year. Therefore, the abolition of the CFA will not pave the way for war which has already commenced, but there will not be a mechanism to stop a major bloodshed.

The absence of the CFA would create a vacuum in the battle field where the entire world is isolated from the realities on ground. The international community has no space and access to information, monitor or intervene in a serious war situation.

Though many have commented otherwise, we feel that there could not be a remarkable change of situation after Jan 16, since it has already commenced since early 2006. The full-scale war is on, bombs and attacks are rampant in Colombo and suburbs – troops are all geared to march towards Tiger-held areas. The abolition of CFA could be considered the unofficial announcement of Eelam War IV (or rather Anti-Eelam War), this time by the government. (All other previous occasions were by the LTTE).

There is no sign of a serious peace process by both sides, especially by the government – all efforts are mere ‘piece-meal-tinkering.’ A full scale war is imminent which may remain at least for a period of two to three years. Any future attempts for talks have to commence from scratch, a cycle that Sri Lanka has witnessed over-and-over again during its long protracted conflict.


Note : The move to abolish the CFA was a response to a political demand by the Marxist JVP to support the government at the previous crucial budget vote. Till then the CFA was considered a ‘dead-body.’ The JVP Marxists are now gaining political mileage through the move highlighting its ‘patriotic – nationalist’ ideologies. Their next demand is to ban the LTTE in Sri Lanka which would completely shut doors for communications with the LTTE for future talks.