The secrecy was the third important feature of the new MJC and its leaders agreed that no organization would issue any press statement, nor would disclose the activities and operations.
This surprising move was to counter international pressure and remove obstacles created by the government. However, just after 9/11 initial response from the Jihadists was very poor. They were not expecting the immense pressure. After Fall of Taliban, jihadi organizations suffered a lot as their important commanders and hundreds of warriors were killed, fighting against the US forces. President Musharraf banned several groups and security agencies arrested thousands of their members besides sealing their offices and banning their fund collection campaigns. [5]
Small organizations could not survive in these circumstances and merged in the big organizations or dissolved [6] . Even the big organizations were finding it hard to survive in the crisis. The atmosphere triggered mistrust and panic amongst Jihadists that caused division amongst them. Jaish-e-Muhammad was divided on the issue whether attacks on Christian missions and foreign interests are fair or not. [7] A group of Harkatul Mujahideen, who wanted to continue targeting foreign interests, parted its way, disagreeing with the high command that believed that it should only focus on Kashmir. [8] Various groups blamed each other for being used by secret agencies and some of them went to the extent of labeling each other as infidels.
However, Markaz-Al-Daawa tul Ershad, Lashkar-e-Taiba’s (LeT) sister organization, was an exception that had realized gravity of the situation just after shift in Pakistan’s pro-jihad policy. It renamed itself as Jamaatud Daawa and dissolved LeT’s Pakistan chapter and shifted its offices in Azad Kashmir. [9]
Jamaat-e-Islami, Pakistan also shifted the offices of its militant wing Hizbul Mujahideen into Azad-Kashmir. [10] Jamaat also declared that it did not have any organizational link with Hizb. It was operating from the premises of JI offices in Pakistan since 1990. JI leadership had also asked the Hizb to remove all hoardings and signboards from Jamaat offices across the country. However, this was just the face-saving steps, otherwise HM is still working as a JI’s subordinate wing in Pakistan but now it has become the part of Shabab-e-Milli (SM), the youth wing of the JI. [11]
Chart 2: Suspected sectarian and terrorist groups identified by the law enforcement agencies 2005
| Name |
Status |
Description |
Network |
| Al-Badar Tigers |
|
Faction of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi |
Punjab, Balochistan |
| Ahle Hadiath Youth Force |
|
Jamait Ahle Hadiath youth wing |
Pakistan |
| Ali Tigers |
|
Sectarian |
Underground |
| Al-Farooq |
|
Sectarian |
Underground |
| Almi Jamaat-e-Ahle Sunnet |
Under observation |
Sectarian |
Punjab |
| Harkatul Mujahideen Alalmi |
Do |
Terrorist |
Underground |
| Jamaitul Mujahideen Alalmi |
Do |
Deobandi jihadi outfit |
Pakistan |
| Tehrik-e-Taliban |
|
Jihadi |
Active in Tribal areas |
| Tehrik Defah-e-Sahaba |
Under observation |
Sectarian |
Punjab, NWFP |
| Lashkar-e-Jhangvi |
Banned |
Terrorist |
Underground |
| Jhangvi Tigers |
|
Terrorist |
Underground |
| Sipah-e-Muhammad |
Banned |
Terrorist |
Still active in Balochistan |
| Ashgaryia Organization |
|
Shia sectarian |
Sindh |
| Khumani Tigers |
|
Shia sectarian and Jihadi |
Underground |
| Nojawana-e-Ishat Toheed wal Sunnah |
|
Sectarian |
Punjab, NWFP |
| Lashkar-e-Umer |
|
terrorist |
underground |
| Tehrik Tahafooz Namoose-Sahaba |
|
Sectarian |
Some parts of Punjab |
| Majlis-e-Ahrar |
Under observation |
Sectarian jihad supporter |
Pakistan |
| Mukhtar Force |
|
Shia |
Punjab, NWFP |
| Imamines |
Under observation |
Shia sectarian outfit |
Punjab |
| Jamaat Ahle Hadiath |
|
Sectarian |
Pakistan |
| Jamait Ghurba-e-Ahle Hadiath |
|
Sectarian & support jihadist |
Pakistan |
| Hizb-e-Islami |
|
Reportedly recruiting Mujahideen for Taliban |
NWFP |
Tactics for Survival:
Other organizations followed footsteps of these two organizations and changed their organizations names. Jiash-e-Muhammad converted into Tehrik Kudamul Islam (Movement of Islamic services) Harkatul Mujahideen into Jamiatul Ansar (Party of Hosts) and Sipah-e-Sahabah becomes the Millat-e-Islamia. (See Chart1) [12] From December 2001 to August 2002 these organizations remained silent, but with the passage of time they started their activities again. This time these outfits appeared with new faces, under cover of religious-political or political groups, apparently excluding agendas, based on Jihad and sectarian hatred from their manifestos. [13] In fact, they are still working for the same objectives and goals.
Some organizations used their political influence for wheeling dealing with the government. For example Sipah-e-Sahaba, the sectarian political party adopted the new name Millat-e-Islamia and his head Member of National Assembly, Maulana Azam Tariq joined the government in November 2002. It was a time when pro-Musharraf Pakistan Muslim League needed the vote of confidence in the Parliament for Prime Minister. Maulana Tariq exploited his position and in return not only got released hundreds of his party workers, involved in the sectarian killing, but also got freedom of movement across the country.
Some jihadi leaders joined the religious political parties and contested the 2002 general elections. Though, a few ones were elected, rest of them were also benefited by the move and groomed their image as politicians. [14]
Chart3 Terrorist groups operated by Al-Qaeda
| Outfit |
Strength |
Areas of operation |
Head |
| Gaand Ullah |
20 |
Karachi |
Ataur Rehman |
| Harkatul Mujahideen Alalmi |
--- |
Karachi |
---- |
| Lashkar-e-Jhangvi |
Above 200 |
Pakistan |
--- |
| Al Badar group |
--- |
Balochistan and Karachi |
--- |
| Lashkar-e-Ummer |
15 |
Punjab and NWFP |
Osama Nazir |
| Harkatul Islami |
---- |
Balochistan |
--- |
This was s complex situation for jihadist, who disappointed a large number of lower cadre militants. They joined Al-Qaeda’s undergrounds groups and started operations on Pakistani soil. [15] (Chart 3; Al-Qaeda underground groups)
By the end of 2002, jihadist outfits managed to make a comeback that strengthened the impression that the government failed to control the non-state actors. In another bid to contain jihadi leaders, the government forbad all the registered members of the jihadi groups from leaving their areas without informing local police stations but this step also did not work as the government was expecting. Only the ban on collecting the funds from public was implemented effectively, which created serious financial problems for jihadi groups. But, they again foiled the government’s bid and found out a way to counter it. They started investing in the agriculture lands and buying the commercial plots for generating money.
Jamaat-ud-Daawa (JD) invested 20 million Rupees in several of its departments which include education, publishing, health, farming, and transportation. [16] The land bought for 25.5 million Rupees is apart from this where training centers, madrasas and mosques are being established. The jamaat plans to establish its centers, madrasas and mosques in all the districts of Pakistan. In the first phase, attention was paid to Sindh where in the three districts big piece of lands had been bought there for this purpose.
JD properties in Pakistan have been reached worth sixty million rupees and it aims at achieving a target of 120 millions rupees more during the next five years. Apart from these, the number of students in its model schools has reached ten thousand approximately and in the madrasas it has touched six thousand. In order to increase its area of influence, it is also establishing health centers and dispensaries. According to one of its leaders, the Jamaat and Lashakar shall be self-sufficient to such an extent that will not need to collect contributions and they shall be in a position to train five thousand mujahideen.
Another challenge for the militant organizations was to find out the new operational areas. After the fall of Taliban Pakistani militant organizations networks and structures were collapsed. Government was also trying to restrict these organizations to continue military support for Taliban. Due to fencing on Line of Control (LoC) and Indo-Pak Peace process the infiltration was reduced rapidly. A few organizations shifted their fields of endeavor from the battlefields to missionary work. Jamaat-ud-Daawa and Al-Rasheed Trust have set up their network in Interior Sindh especially in the Hindu majority districts. These organizations have set up dozens of madrasas, mosques, dispensaries, and other welfare centers. Their first target is to ‘reform’ the Hindu population of the area. In view of its aims and objectives, Jamaat-ud-Daawa has already launched a Sindhi magazine while this area also gets special attention in its other publications as well. [17]
While the northern areas of Pakistan share borders with China and Afghanistan, a narrow strip called ‘Wakhan’ of Afghanistan separates it from Tajikistan. Most of the people here are Ismaili or Asna Ashari shias. Those of the Ahl-e-sunnat comprise only ten percent of the population and they believe that the Ismailis want to establish their own state here.
Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnat, Baltistan is the representative religious organization of the Sunnis. They have a good number of their madrasas and mosques here. The Agha Khan Foundation network is quite strong here and they are already running a number of welfare projects. However, Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnat asserts that they are working only for the Ismaili population and it wants to establish a separate state here. Apart from Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnat, Tanzeem-ul-Akhwan was also running some welfare organizations here but now apart from Al-Rasheed Trust, Jamiat-ul-Ansar, Jamaat-ud-Daawa, and Tahreek-e-Khuddame-e-Islam have also started setting up their networks. Their aim is to minimize the impact of the Agha Khan Foundation in these areas and to find out safe training camps for their mujahideen so that they may reach up to Afghanistan and central Asia more easily.
The Government of Pakistan made another attempt to crush down the jihadist in November 2003 and banned some more organizations, barring them from working with changed names. [18]
The second ban was largely ineffective. The basic reason was that it was not a new situation for them. This time they responded to the ban strongly and not only changed their names but also the outfit’s structures. Six of them now are working as the charities. Jiash-e-Muhammad is now working by the name Al-Rehmat Trust, Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami as Al-Ershad Trust and Harkatul Mujahideen as Al-Asar Trust in the Pakistan premises. [19] But in Kashmir they are still active with their original names under the MJC codes.
In NWFP and Balochistan, the outfits are still alive but they have lost confidence of their own operatives, despite all the favorable conditions. [20] Here militants don’t need support from any organization for carrying out jihad. They can directly join Taliban, especially in Federally administrative Tribal areas of Pakistan, North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan’s Phuston belt. According to the local sources the Taliban has allowed individuals only to join them with a condition that they will not form any Pakistani group, within the Taliban. The Taliban have adopted this policy after some bitter experiences with Pakistan’s jihadi organizations. [21]
Jihadi organizations are still working in Pakistan. After 9/11, they are continuously changing tactics for survival. Government has also achieved some goals. Now, no outfit can recruit mercenaries or collect funds or hold open public meetings because of the government’s checks. Their organizational structures are weaker now but still pose a threat.
There is need to do more to crush the threat of non-state actors, which are now becoming more of internal threat than to neighbors. During 2004-5, there were above 100 terrorists’ attacks in Pakistan, including 10 suicide bombings, which killed only Pakistanis. The culprits arrested for bombings and target killing belonged to militant outfits. [22]
The present scenario of militant groups in Pakistan developed during last four year especially after 9/11. The tactics these organizations used:
-
After every ban, these organizations would change their names
-
Now, they are changing identities and are emerging as charities and missionaries
-
Find out new ways like purchasing the lands and investing in education and health business for financial survival.
-
Developing political image
After Earthquake:
The earthquake in Pakistan on October 8, 2005 provided them another opportunity for better surveillance. The jihadist groups JD, Hizbul Mujahideen and Al-Badr Mujahideen and religious political parties Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam and Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan are more active in the relief activities about hundreds young militants brought food, medicine, blankets and drinking water for shell-shocked locals, arriving days ahead of government relief teams and even the Pakistan Army.[23]
A fair amount of damage was also occurred to some terrorist training camps in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. The training camps as well as the offices of the groups in the District of Manshera and other part of Azad Kashmir have also been destroyed. According to the reports from local journalists many important commanders and leaders have died or injured which includes Jamaatud Daawa (JD), Jiash-e-Muhammad and Hizbul Mujahideen commanders. The training capms and other infrastructure belonging to Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Tehreek-ul-Mujahideen (TuM), Al-Badar Mujahideen, Harkatul Mujahideen and Jiash-e-Muhammad in Manshera District of NWFP have been badly damaged. All these areas fall within a radius of 10 kilometers from the epicenter of the earthquake. Many of their members were either dead or seriously injured. JEM and LET camps in Sangerbar, Albadr, Hizbul Mujahideen camps, in Oggi and HM and other small group’s camps were situated at Barashi in Manshera district. Local journalist claim there might be the causalities more then thousands but these organizations are trying to hide the loses. [24] Moreover, one should not over-estimate the damages suffered by the training infrastructure of the militant groups. Their training camps generally consist of tents and other makeshift structures, which can be shifted from place to place to evade detection and targeting. Even if these have been damaged, the human casualties are likely to be low.
The jihadist are currently regrouping with the prevalent atmosphere also offering them an opportunity to reinforce their support structures within Azad Kashmir and in Pakistan, at the expense of the administration, which has come in for a great amount of flak for its delayed and ineffective response to the disaster. Groups that advocate radical Islam consider relief efforts and social aid to people who have been disregarded by the state as an important part of their strategy. Jamat-ud-Daawa, the parent organisation of the LeT have diverted a considerable part of its network towards relief efforts. The other Jihadist groups that have contributed to quake relief are the Karachi-based Al-Rashid Trust (ART), Al-Rehmat Trust of Jiash-e-Muhammad, Al-Furqan Trust of Jamaatul Furqan, Al-Aser Trust of Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami, Al-Badar Mujahideen, Tehrikul Mujahideen, Al-Akhtar Trust and the charity wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami. President Musharraf vacillating and deficient response has led people to seek assistance from the jihadists. The JD has emerged as the most effective relief agency that has built up an excellent rapport with the victims.
In fact the government’s failure to respond quickly and effectively left room for Islamist groups to gain public goodwill by being the first in taking aid to some devastated areas.
President Pervez Musharraf’s public apology for the government’s inadequate response indicates government has failed to deliver effective aid in a natural disaster. Government’s failure create the room for militants groups to gain the public support, while giving the gesture government is not interested or capable to deliver relief for masses. It’s also a fact that militant organizations are dedicated and uncorrupt, while government bodies are riddled with corruption, laziness and incompetence. The militant organizations are organized and disciplined, with considerable funds from mosque and private collections at home and abroad.
The same happened in 1989, when a major earthquake struck the Tipasa region in Algeria, the official response was pathetic. In Egypt, three years later, the poorer districts of Cairo itself did not see a government official for days after a tremor killed hundreds. In Turkey, too, the civilian government and the powerful military failed lamentably after a tremor in 1999 killed nearly 20,000 and left 50,000 homeless. [25] Such seismic shocks can translate into political upheavals. The cancellation of national and local elections in 1991, in which the Islamist groups were set to win handsomely for the first time, led to 10 years of bloody civil war in Algeria. In Egypt, the years after the Cairo earthquake saw the largely non-violent Muslim Brotherhood take over key parts of civil society, and a vicious war between radical militants and state security services. The state’s poor showing in the Turkish earthquake contributed to the victory of an, albeit very moderate, Islamist party in elections there. A relatively reformist government in Iran, widely criticized for its performance in the Ban earthquake of 2003, was beaten by conservatives earlier this year. [26]
NewTargets:
In the changing scenario these organizations have been set up new targets:
1. To launch maximum charity projects for getting people’s support, recruiting new militants and collecting funds.
2. Some groups especially affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the frustrated individuals from jihad organizations are operating in Pakistan, especially targeting the Christian’s missions, foreign interests and minority sects.
3. Bringing the Islamic revolution through education
4. Enhancing the role as non-state actors to enforce Shariah in the country.[27]
Their new targets are posing new threats not only for Pakistan but also for the rest of the world.
1. The role of militant groups in Afghanistan has been curtailed by the government. Conducting the jihad in Kashmir is becoming difficult day by day. The trend of setting up underground jihad organizations is increasing that poses serious threat that the militants may knit a large terrorists network in Pakistan and other countries.
2. Jihadist are rapidly penetrating in education system and are disorientating the youth. 3. They are strengthening ties with political groups and may pressurize the government through political alliance to achieve their goals related to militancy.
The Challenge:
This is a big challenge for President Musharraf’s government to handle with the jihadist tactics and their new targets. The new front which needed more attention is ideological. The government is just responding to the terrorist’s activities and taking seriously the expanding roll in education and social services sector. However much the jihadist movements appear to be suppressed, they will revive absent a more effective ideological response.
[1] There are 244 religious organizations working in Pakistan out of which 25 are political in nature and participate in elections, 145 have sectarian bases, 12 don’t believe in democracy and want to set up Khalafah and 104 are jihadi.
[2] Muttahid Jihad Council (Untied jihad council) was established in 1991 to solve the internal differences among different jihad groups and for adopting joint operational strategies.
[3] President General Musharraf in his historical January 12, 2002 speech had announced that all the organizations, which have the words like jihad, lashkar, jaish or mujahideen will be banned. He had said “There is no need for Lashkars (Army), Jaishs (Armed group) and “Mujahideen” (Holy Warriors) in presence of a regular Army.
[4] Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jiash-e-Muhammad, Brigade 313 and Al-Bader Mujahideen are considered as important jihad organizations but they were not the part of MJC because their leadership is Pakistan based. All these organizations were making efforts to become the member of MJC and were adjusted in the new structure.
[5] Five organizations; Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami, Harkatul Mujahideen, Jiash-e-Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Tehrik Nifaz-e-Shariat Muhammdi suffered a lot. Some of their important commanders and hundreds of workers were killed. Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami’s 340, Harkatul Mujahideen’s 79, Jaish-e-Muhammad’s 36 and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi’s 27 militants were killed according to their own claims. While 14 of Harkatul Mujahideen, 7 of Jiash-e-Muhammad and 11 of Harkatul Jihad militants were found in Guantenamo bay. (These figures published in their publications).
[6] Especially the organizations belonging from the Bralivi school of thought suffered very much and out of 14 now only one organization, Lashkar-e-Islam is still active.
[7] Amir Rana, Daily Times April 12, 2003---Jaish-e-Muhammad’s supreme commander had ordered to attack on the churches in Pakistan. He claimed that he did it with Maulana Masood Azher’s consent. Later Masood had denied and expelled 12 important commanders including Jabbar from the organization.
[8] A group of Harkatul Mujahideen parted ways from the organization in February 2002 and formed Harkatul Mujahideen Alalmi. They started targeting foreign interests. This group was involved in the attacks on a French Engineers bus, the American Consulate and also tried to assassinate President Musharraf
[9] Daily Jang Islamabad December 29, 2001-Jamaatud Daawa’s head Prof Hafiz Muhammad Saeed in a press conference on December 27, 2001 announced to dissolve Lashkar-e-Taiba. He declared LeT as an independent organization which will work only in Kashmir
[10] Many of its founding members were the veterans of the Afghan struggle who had fought under the Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbaden Hikmatyar. It depended on the experience and the training of the Afghan war veterans. The Jamaat-e-Islam started supporting HM from 1991 when the insurgency in the India-held Kashmir peaked. Hizb was working under the direct patronage of the Jamaat and its offices were in JI offices around the country. While Qazi Hussain Ahmad was the chief Patron of the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) according to the constitution of the organization and had the authority to remove or assign any person to HM head. The Chief of Jamaat-e-Islami, Qazi Hussain Ahmad in May 2003, talking to a reporter in a seminar categorically stated that his party had no links with the HM and added that the jihad outfit was based in India-held Kashmir and was fighting indigenously for the right of self determination of the Kashmiris. When a reported tried to pin him down on reports that most HM offices in Pakistan were being run by the JI workers, he said these offices were set up by the HM’s sympathizers in the party and not by the JI.
[11] Amir Rana, Daily Times, Lahore, September 8, 2003
[12] Mussharaf had banned the 7 organizations on January12, 2005, while Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Muhammad were already declared terrorist organization on August 2001. There is the table of the organizations, which were banned and later changed their names.
[13] It is interesting that Anti-Shia party, Sipah-e-Sahaba (Millat-e-Islamia) in its new manifesto stressed for the sectarian harmony and unity, which was totally contrary to its previous manifesto.
[14] Some of them were elected on the JUI seats despite being members of Harkatul Mujahideen and Hizbul Mujahideen
[15] These are just operational groups and obey command instructions, which are given time to time. After completion the target they were assigned other target with the different group name. According to an intelligence official, Al-Qaeda itself choose the members from the different jihadi organizations, especially sectarian banned terrorist group like LJ and Harkatul Jihadi Islami Alalmi.
[16] Friday Times, Lahore, February 2003
[17] Several reports and travelogues also found place in the publications of the Jamaat and Al-Rasheed Trust. Mujalla Al-Daawa published one such travelogue, “Most of the Hindus have decorated their doorways in the town of Mutthi with the pictures of Hanuman. Walking thorough this town, one gets the impression that it is a Hindustani village where Hindus perform their rites against Islam and Muslims. They also make a dent on their faith. This group came back after two days of moving around in the desert and saw so many things during this time that exhibit how artfully their faith has been defiled and it is difficult for an ordinary Muslim to even mark that defilement. The Hindus are spreading their culture by mixing their ways into the Muslim lives. The ulema and propagators of faith should try their best to stop this wave, and if every Muslim tries to play his role, the increasing influence of the Hindus on the religious and political lives in Sindh may be stopped. If no attention is paid to these, not only the people and the country will be affected crucially but they shall be liable to answer on the Day of Judgment. May God give us senses”
[18] See chart no 2
[19] These jihadist trusts have started different welfare projects, like ambulances service, free medical camps etc.
[20] In Balochistan and NWFP jihadists have no need to join Taliban or AL-Qaeda through Pakistani jihad organizations as they believe all jihad organizations are created by ISI and working on its lines.
[21]The Taliban accused some Pakistani jihad leaders of cooperating with the government and are responsible for the arrest of some Al-Qaeda leaders.
[22] Jiash and HUJI militants were involved in the most of the attacks
[23]ibid
[24] The control stations of Lashkar-e-Toiba and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen have been destroyed, too. The launching pads of militants have also been smashed by the quake. Hizb and LeT had suffered major losses in their Azad Kashmir camp.
[25]Jason Burke, Quoted by Daily Times, Lahore, October 18, 2005
[26] ibid
[27] Their role as non-state actors is vividly expanding. Recently Jamaatud Daawa announced to establish District Shariah courts around the country. In NWFP, provincial government of the religious party’s alliance is already trying to impose self-made Shariah laws. In tribal areas a Taliban commander, Biatullah Mehsud has prepared a Lashkar (army) for imposing Shariah on people.
