SOUTHASIANET - COMMENTARY
Dated: 26-09-2008

Marriott Blast: Security Implications for the Capital

Safdar Sial

It was not the first or the second terrorist attack on Marriott Hotel, located in the heart of Islamabad, but the third one, which rocked the entire city on 20 September besides completely burning the hotel out. The burnt-out wrecks of cars outside the hotel presented a post-war look. Just five hours before this blast, Pakistan’s newly elected president, Mr Asif Ali Zardari, was pledging to fight terrorism while addressing the joint session of the National Assembly and Senate at Parliament House, not so far from the Marriott. According to media reports and official statements, Islamabad was completely cordoned off [that day] to counter any terrorist threat, as there were already intelligence reports indicating movement of suicide attackers towards the city. Quite ironically an explosive-laden bumper truck travelled across the high security zones of Islamabad to reach its apparent target, the Marriott. The militants have, once again, shown they are less rhetoric and more operational.

The twin cities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi have been in the grip of violence and terrorism since the Lal Mosque-Jamia Hafsa debacle in July last year. Being close to the Taliban-infested NWFP and FATA, Islamabad and Rawalpindi bear the direct threat from militants. Secondly, being the heart of Pakistan Islamabad becomes the target of militants to terrorize the government against the security operations in NWFP and FATA. Since July last year, Islamabad has faced seven terrorist attacks including four suicide attacks, the latest being the deadly truck suicide attack on the Marriott. During the same period, the militants have hit the Rawalpindi eight times with fierce suicide attacks. Two deadliest suicide blasts on 21 August this year at the outer gates of the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) Wah Cant – some 30 kilometers away from Islamabad – if included in this ongoing spree of violent attacks in [and near] Islamabad, the frequency of terrorist attacks becomes more than one in a month during July 2007 to September 2008.1

Despite large number of arrests (security forces arrested about 400 suspected militants from 1 March to 15 September 2008 in Islamabad and Rawalpindi)2, repeated claims of improved intelligence and security measures by the government, and much trumpeted pledge to fight and curb the terrorism, the security situation on the ground is depleting. The militants have time and again challenged the writ of state right in the heart of state. They have entered the capital. The dumper truck, carrying about 600Kgs of deadly explosive material, which hit the Marriott, was not probably prepared in and sent from some far-flung area. It may be one of the dozens of the trucks we see daily on roads of Islamabad moving unrestricted and unchecked even on the main roads and in high security zones.

Pakistan Army, security forces, sensitive places, political figures and foreign concerns have remained the high value targets of the militants in [and near] Islamabad. This range of targets is quite similar to that in Pakistani tribal areas and the frontier province. The Marriott Hotel was an oasis of calm for diplomats and politicians in the capital, but its status as a symbol of Western capitalism made it a repeated target for militants.3 Marriott International has about 3,000 lodging properties in the United States and 67 other countries around the globe. Over a dozen American Marines had also been staying at the hotel when it was attacked. Apparently the target was Marriott Hotel. Some say the US Marines were the target.4 Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani said, “It is not security lapse. The terrorists failed to achieve their prime target, which was to hit the Parliament House and the Prime Minister House. They were not allowed to get near to their real target,” the PM said while addressing a news conference at VVIP lounge of Lahore Airport on his arrival from Islamabad.5

Whatever be the real target of the militants in this blast, it is evident they have very deadly agenda, very strong network, a solid operational capability and an enhanced presence in Islamabad and its proximity. It has been reported in media time and again that Lal Mosque associates in jihadi and Taliban groups have not left the city. Some violent banned jihadi outfits like Jaish-e-Mohammad and Jamat ul-Furqan have also strong network in Rawalpindi and neighbouring areas. The Lal Mosque-Jamia Hafsa had strong links with militant outfits. It is also widely believed that Maulana Abdullah (father of Maulana Abdul Aziz and Maulana Abdul Rashid) was patron to several sectarian groups such as the banned Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. Moreover, Jamiat Tauheed-wal-Isha’at Quran-wal-Sunnah (JTIQS), the banned Tehreek-e-Nifaz Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) and Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan (new name of Sipah-e-Sahaba) have been openly supporting the Lal Mosque administration. The more important was Maulana Abdul Rasheed Ghazi’s links with al-Qaeda, which came on surface in 2004, when Osama bin Laden’s driver Usman was arrested in Islamabad in connection with alleged sabotage activities in the capital. He was Maulana Abdul Rasheed’s guest and traveling in his car when arrested on August 11, 2005.6

It will not be realistic to see the Lal Mosque as an isolated entity from the militant groups operating in Pakistan. This was an effort to extend the influence and presence of militants in the heart of Pakistan, and Lal Mosque was used for that purpose. Nor are Taliban and al-Qaeda ignorant of the strategic significance of the capital when they come to force the government to give in before their agenda. Obviously when they want to consolidate themselves [or hit their targets] outside FATA and NWFP, banned jihadi groups are there to help them. The same can be true in case of Islamabad and its vicinity.

The threat is more than real. Islamabad is no more a safe capital. Nonetheless, the heinous Marriott blast in the heart of Islamabad highlights security inadequacies.  Defence analyst Ayesha Siddiqa says the bombing highlighted a breakdown in morale in the security system as a whole. “Police do not want to be targeted, so they are not filling the gap, and other forces cannot do the job. So the law and order system really is collapsing,” said Siddiqa, adding, “Whatever the threat, it is definitely going to spread because you cannot control it.” Nonetheless, Pakistan’s law Minister and Mr. President have termed the Marriott blast as 9/11 of Pakistan. They should also keep in mind how the victim of 9/11, US, is still actively engaged in “capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading the terrorists across the globe” even after 7 years of the incident. And we are yet unable to secure the capital. Owning the war on terror will need Herculean efforts. Mere rhetoric may encourage the militants.

Related Stories:
1. Marriott Blast: How to Single out Culprit Group from a Pool of Terrorists?
2. Lal Mosque: Aftermath and Future Repercussions
3. Lal Mosque's Terror Link
4. How the Suicide Attackers Operate in Pakistan

1- All statistics are based on PIPS Database.

2-PIPS Database.

3-Daily Times, Islamabad, September 22, 2008 

4-The News, Islamabad, September 21, 2008.

5-The Nation, Islamabad, September 24, 2008.

6-PIPS Database.


 

 

 

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