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Muhammad Amir Rana
A clear verdict from Pakistani voters against pro-Musharraf political parties has stunned policymakers in Washington. The Bush administration has built its anti-terror strategy in the region around a single person i.e., President Pervez Musharraf. In return, he has extended unprecedented military cooperation to the United States. Now, after the election defeat, Washington sees its favourite ally losing ground without an alternative to fall back on.
The American concern is obvious: who will pursue its policies if President Musharraf is either not in power or no longer in a position to do so? Will the new government be able to advance U.S. policies, especially in the war on terror? Will there be a paradigm shift in the Pak-US relations, or a deal with the new government can be made to maintain the status-quo? How will the electoral mandate of the people translate into government policies: more cooperation with Washington or a change in the terms of alliance?
Much was invested in Banazir Bhutto by the Bush administration as a post-Musharraf political ally. But, after her tragic assassination last year, it seems to have no option but to continue backing Musharraf. Diplomats at the U.S. embassy in Islamabad are closely monitoring post-election development and encouraging a deal between Musharraf and opposition parties, mainly the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). So far, the PPP seems more inclined to form a coalition with the Pakistan Muslim League (N) with which Washington does not feel at ease because of its political plank of Islamic nationalism.
There are similar concerns about the Awami National Party (ANP), which is likely to form provincial government in the troubled North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and may enter into an alliance with the PPP at the centre as well. A secular, leftwing Pashtun nationalist party that advocates non-violence, the ANP has always condemned the U.S. hegemony in the region. Now, the party will have to address the terrorism issue, especially in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, and it is likely to stress on a political solution which would put a lot of American interests at stake.
Until now, the U.S. policy for Pakistani tribal areas is focused on containing al-Qaeda in this region and minimizing its global operations capabilities. If al-Qaeda and the Taliban are driven out or if there is somehow peace in the tribal areas, they could shift their centres into Afghanistan, where NATO troops are already struggling, and can scatter into other parts of the world posing a bigger security threat for the United States. So, the main objective of Washington’s counterterrorism strategy in Pakistan has been to restrict and eliminate al-Qaeda’s epicentre by building cooperation with Pakistan for intelligence sharing and military operations.
It is understandable that after many years of concerted efforts and having spent billions of dollars in pursuit of this military option, Washington wants to see continuity in Islamabad’s policy. President Musharraf is the best bet to ensure that. At the same time, however, anti-Musharraf emotions are very high in the country and no political party can ignore the public’s sentiment. In the election year, the Bush administration has already been facing criticism from the U.S. media and Democrats over its unrelenting support to Musharraf. If the new parliament seems less responsive to the demands from Washington, it would create more trouble for the Republicans in the November elections.
By giving a verdict against extremism, the Pakistani voters have sent a clear message to the international community that the fears of fundamentalists taking over Pakistan are exaggerated. It should also reduce the anxiety in the West about Pakistani nukes as the new government will in likelihood be made up of moderate and secular political forces.
What is worrisome is that the US anxiety over Musharraf may lead to instability in Pakistan. If an unnatural alliance between Musharraf and democratic political parties is imposed, or if the United States tries to build pressure on the new Pakistani government on this issue, it would not only create political instability but would also prepare ground for extremists. Apart from a rise in acts of terrorism, the Taliban and their chief mentors in Pakistan may once again be able to stir up anti-US sentiments for political gains. In such circumstances, the ability of the new government to settle and govern will be severely undermined.
Pakistan will still be an ally of the United States in its struggle against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. But the goals this policy can be better achieved if democracy is allowed to flourish. The problem of terrorism needs to be addressed more broadly and strategically than the military-only tactics employed by the United States and Pakistan. While the use of force to counter terrorism is essential, it cannot be resolved only through military means.
It is in the best interest of Pakistan and the United States that the democratic process should remain on track. Pakistan’s new government will have to take up the fight against terrorism as its own war. Terrorism is as much a threat to Pakistan as to the world. The country needs economic and military assistance as well as political backing from the international community to counter extremism. But international collaboration and cooperation should be based on the basic principle of mutuality of interests.
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