Abstract
Pakistan Army launched a massive offensive against Taliban in Malakand region of NWFP in the last week of April 2009. The operation was chosen as a last resort after two agreements by the provincial government with non-state actors failed to ensure peace in the region. However, the counterinsurgents have not benefited fully from insurgents’ weaknesses nor built on their own strengths. To understand the factors that allowed the Taliban a foothold in the areas that they now control would go a long way in identifying ways to counter them. How counterinsurgents manipulate insurgents’ disadvantage in their own favor would ultimately prove crucial. The task requires vision, will and capacity, but so far the state seems to lack effective strategy on this tactical front. The Taliban insurgency in the tribal areas has regional dimensions as well, with regional and global actors trying to secure their own interests in the area. But ignoring Pakistan’s concerns and regional interests would frustrate the counterinsurgency effort. Pakistan cannot snuff out the insurgency alone. The international community asking Pakistan to do more must show its commitment to doing more itself on these counts.

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