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Suicide attacks¹ are a terrorist tactic aimed to gain broader political objectives² and have mostly taken place in armed conflicts of non international character.³ Preventing Suicide attacks is considered to be impossible. I disagree with the notion because suicide attacks may have much higher chances of success but it is not impossible to check the phenomenon. There are many cases in which suicide attackers were identified, arrested or killed before they could reach their target and detonate the explosive material. However, prevention of such attack needs a strategic response rather a tactical detection only.

In this paper, I will suggest that checking the motivational basis of terrorists; denying them opportunities for attacks; and thwarting their operational capacity should be main goals of a strategy to prevent the suicide attacks and other terrorist activities in Pakistan.

On October 23, 1982, operationally first most successful and politically significant suicide attack took place in Beirut when almost 300 American and French marines were killed by the Islamic Jihad (later on called Hezbollah) and this resulted in withdrawal of the U.S., the French and the Israeli forces from Lebanon. This success emboldened the perpetrators and perpetrators believed that "it works".⁴ Next thirty years have seen the repetition of this trend in Israel, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan at larger scale. Though significantly small in number, but very critical incidents took place in India⁵, Indonesia⁶, Saudi Arabia and the U.S.⁷ In Saudi Arab, Libya and Yemen, there are not many incidents of suicide attacks as compared to previous years. The U.S. and Pakistan are facing terrorist attacks incessantly. Pakistan's case is more important to study because not only it is a victim of suicide attacks but many of the failed terrorist attempts in the U.S. are also linked to Pakistani individuals in one way or other.⁸ Therefore, it is pertinent to study phenomenon of suicide attacks in Pakistan and to suggest some preventive strategies.

Countering the suicide terrorism is a formidable challenge for Pakistan for three reasons. First, it is the prime target of suicide terrorism in the world.⁹ In 2009, 3,021 Pakistanis were killed in suicide attacks, 33 percent more than in 2008.¹⁰ Until, July 01, 2010, 3719 people have been died while 9464 have been injured in 257 suicide attacks in Pakistan.¹¹ Second, it is predominantly a Muslim country and religious narratives are used in everyday life overwhelmingly. This helps the terrorist organizations to recruit more terrorists easily in the name of Allah. Third, state has not made sincere efforts to regulate the religious affairs rather it has been instrumental in exploiting the religious narrative for national security. Due to these factors, it is necessary to study the available policy options.

Intervention Policies

The policies to combat suicide terrorism can be divided in of two types. First option is to follow a hard policy. Mostly, it is reactive in nature and applicable in short term. Second option is soft policy. It is proactive and long term policy intervention. The hard policies, especially military and police operations are required in the short run to break the momentum of violent activities of anti government forces, to destroy their command and control centers and to dismantle their network quickly. It is a costly option

and not a long term response to the terrorism. Legitimacy of these operations is also questionable sometimes if process to approve these operations is not constitutional and democratic. It also requires some back up strategy by civilian agencies to sustain the gains achieved by military campaign. Civilian LEAs are integral part of the hard policies and they work on long term basis to consolidate the results of such rapid military operations and to establish the control of the state authorities in area under operation.

On the other hand, soft policies aim at checking the motivational aspects of the perpetrators. These policies are designed to change the behavior and response of the perpetrators and to facilitate the peaceful transition of the radical individuals into the society. These policies also subsume non coercive means to prepare the public opinion against terrorism. Change in public opinion curtails the operational capacity and opportunities for the suicide attackers to conduct their operations of killing innocent civilians easily. These policies are proactive and long term but also expensive because it takes long time to bear fruit and there is no consensus of experts on success indicators of such policies. Therefore, the combination of hard and soft policies is applied in different countries.¹² By analyzing strategies adopted by others, we may find some patterns which are valid or invalid in Pakistani context.

Framework of Preventive Strategy

I will argue that to craft any anti terrorism strategy, it is critical to focus on the three elements. Suicide attacks are committed when 1) motivation and 2) opportunity meet the 3) operational capability of the perpetrator.¹³ In western countries most of the work has been done on the opportunity and capability aspects which has saved them from further attacks after 9/11 attack in the U.S. and 7/7 incidents in the UK. In case of Pakistan, lot of work needs to be done by taking a holistic approach starting from checking the motivation of the terrorists to conduct suicide attacks.

Motivation

To counter this process, there is need to develop an organized and well coordinated, long term plan which targets hearts and minds of the people. For this matter we need clearly identify the target audience into four categories for whom these policy interventions are crafted.

Category 1: Arrested and Convicted Extremists

We can focus on two sections of society: one section is people who are arrested and convicted attackers during failed attempts or during planning phase of any suicide attack or terrorist act. The second section is people who are directly related to these terrorists and they have direct bearings by capturing or killing of the suspected terrorist.

Rehabilitation Program for convicts and accused: For the first section, along with incarceration, there should be an opportunity of rehabilitation programs in the prisons like Saudi Arab¹⁴ or Indonesia.¹⁵ These programs are aimed at educating the terrorist about religion by exchange of information under the supervision of a well educated scholar. Besides, they should be given chances to meet their relatives, family, children and other good friends. In the absence of these steps, they will be just consolidating their thoughts and will wait to get free and continue their work. They are more dangerous because they keep on preaching their ideology in prisons and radicalize many others. If they are being introduced to a hopeful vision of life, then chances are higher that they will be assimilated in society as useful citizens.

Rehabilitation of Children of the Conflict: The second section of society comprises of immediate dependents or relatives of the captured or killed terrorists. This section also needs rehabilitation program. Sometime there are children of the perpetrator but they are innocent because it is not their fault that their father was a terrorist. Sometimes there are orphans whose elders are killed by military operation or drone attacks or they are sentenced to prison by police action. Sometime failed attackers who are alive but they are juvenile offenders. What is recourse available for them? Are they part of supply chain of terrorist for the Taliban or victims of this prolonged conflict in Pakistan? To me, they are the children of the conflict. So far, there is no attention paid by the government to rehabilitate the families of the killed Taliban or to bring them in the fold of governmental auspices by one way or the other. In this situation, every success of the government will be creating more anti state sentiments in the affected families. In the absence of any rehabilitation plan for such vulnerable groups, the killing of insurgents will be creating more terrorists and a reason of sustained supply of bombers for the Taliban.

In 2008, an attempt was made to develop a Shelter House for such orphans and children who were victims of the conflict in N.W.F.P (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) with the help of an international NGO Save the Children in Pakistan and military authorities and Police department in District Dera Ismael Khan.¹⁶ After psychiatric examination of some suspect children, it was planned to have a safe house in a peaceful city for proper education and boarding facilities for such children. Major General Tariq Khan (Then General Officer Commanding, 14th Division Pakistan Army) based in the district was especially very helpful and willing to implement the idea. He was mindful of the situation in South or North Waziristan and was keen to address the civilian issues in the aftermath of any military operation. Due to some logistical issues and legal barriers the project was not completed but this is a viable approach to prevent the future generation of affiliates of Taliban to fall into the trap of violence.

Category 2: Supporters and Sympathizers

Second category is those who are identified supporters and sympathizers of the Taliban and even Al Qaeda. It is important to note that radicalization, as such, does not necessarily have to result in terrorism and the use of violence.¹⁷ There is high probability of their involvement in any forthcoming active mission, may be in non violent fashion. Radical elements and extremists use them as protectors and these people provide safe heavens, information and material support when required by the terrorists. In case of terrorist incident in the U.S. nearly all of the terrorists like Najeeb ullah Zazi, Faisal Shahzad and Richard Headly seem to have relied on an intermediary – like an extremist cleric or a terrorist recruiter – to facilitate and catalyze their radicalization.¹⁸ They should be focused directly through monitoring by law enforcement agencies and public representatives at grass root level.

Ideological Surveillance-Monitoring targeted Mosques, Madrassas and Educational Institutions: Hasan Askari, a security and political analyst says "In Karachi, in Lahore, in Peshawar, you have Islamic clergy that preaches radicalism".¹⁹ "This easy access to such teachings makes Pakistan an attractive place for foreigners. Only one or two percent resort to violence".²⁰ This is valid for many Mosques, Madrassas, public and private educational institutions of Pakistan. It is important to mention that all the mosques or Madrassas in Pakistan are not involved in terrorist activities or in radicalization campaigns. Most of them do not follow the Taliban and their extremist ideology. With constant monitoring it is possible to focus on those religious leaders who are most responsible for hate material. The ideological surveillance by well educated personalities and authorities, on the pattern of France, can be very useful.²¹ Countering

this radicalization, philosophy and strategic logic of suicide bombing is a soft, long term strategy and needs to be implemented at grass root level without any exception to a place.

In district Mianwali of Punjab there are 240 registered Madrassas and when I asked for a meeting with their managers, the representatives of only 116 were available for the meeting.²² It transpired that many were just ghost Madrassas which never existed on ground. Some of them were closed or shifted and lists were not updated. Some were found only on paper to get funding from foreign and local organizations probably.

I was able to engage them in a dialogue and issue some basic security directions which were meant to sharing some responsibility for security and to prevent unauthorized use of their Madrassas like giving shelter to some “guests” or hiring some teachers without proper background checks. Engaging them for periodic meetings is one thing but monitoring the activities taking place there is another one. It is a highly resource intensive operation. However, when I asked for data about students and their antecedents, response was positive. Some of the schools started keeping full record of the students including pictures and a roster of their movements from the Madrassas. It is a positive and offensive strategy which is common feature in most of the countries in the west but not much used in Pakistan where there is no willingness to do this task or where there is no information sharing culture among the civilian LEAs.²³ On these lines, regular surveillance of the ideological teachings given in these Madrassas should be continued. In addition to that, other private and public educational institutions should also be brought into the fold of this monitoring by building cooperation among other government institutions like education department. At the moment Police officials do report such activities, mostly sermons of Friday prayers, but rarely there is evidence collection to take any action on such speeches in the Mosques. If evidence is collected, local commanders do not encourage taking legal action against the speakers to avoid any public demonstration and to hush up the matter for their own convenience and temporary popularity among the locals. Educational institutions are other most important places where this ideological surveillance is required to check if any ground work is going on the motivational aspect by some teachers or student organizations.

Category 3: General Public

Third and largest category is the potential victims of the suicide attacks; the general public. The ideological response should be designed to deprive the terrorists from their supporters and turning them against the terrorists. Without public support, terrorists cannot operate.²⁴ Practically, they support these attackers unknowingly, contribute funds for propagation of Islam in small scale and they have never been affected by terrorism in any possible manner. These people are mainly supporters and sympathizers of any organization who has religious appeal.

Public awareness campaigns and Media: Media can be used for public awareness about the threat and should be a main ally to counter these trends. Images of terrorist’s attacks in Pakistan were telecast by media and it generated anti Taliban sentiments in public. Before that people were not aware of the horrendous acts of the Taliban. Attacks on FIA buildings in Lahore, Marriot Hotel, Islamabad, Pearl Continental Peshawar, and Military G.H.Q Rawalpindi and on Sri Lankan cricket Team in Liberty market of Lahore were eye opener for people.²⁵ Media groups received serious threats from Tehrik I Taliban Pakistan (TTP) for not giving the version of the Taliban in South Waziristan Agency when operation Rah I Nijat started in November 2009.²⁶ Peshawar Press club was targeted by a suicide

attacker.²⁷In order to be effectively contributing for the country, it will be imperative for media groups to take a position which is in line with national interest.

Public Participation against Suicide Terrorism: There is a positive response by the Police to prepare contingency plans and do mock exercises time and again. However, these exercises lack public participation in strategic terms so far. In real life incidents, people help a lot and it is not possible for fire brigade, medical units and other emergency services to deal with the situations without their help. There is need to incorporate the role of people in the plans and train them accordingly, making lists of volunteers who can be helpful in identifying the suspects or where there is a potential niche of terrorists. This is possible by abridging the gap between law enforcement agencies and the public. But it requires trust building.

Open informed Discussions were highly successful in two of the districts where I printed posters bearing the pictures of martyr police and army officers and asked for public cooperation. I widely circulated these posters in the district Nankana Sahib and District Mianwali to create awareness about the threat and get people involved in the process to combat terrorism. It informed people and fostered a dialogue among all sections of society in an open forum. At tactical level, almost many countries have taken steps for awareness of public at large. However, at policy level, it is imperative to develop specialized programs by scholars on this particular subject and take these programs to public at large.

Teaching Counter Terrorism: In major universities of the U.S. and the U.K., terrorism is being taught as an important subject in various faculties. It highlights the demand to know about the subject as well as it is a mean to give a forum for people to learn and explore the phenomenon of terrorism. Lot of literature is now available in western countries but not much data and research is conducted in countries which are victims of terrorism; where such debates should have been taken place. Though media is full of news but there is little evidence of any research work under taken in universities and colleges of Pakistan. Terrorism needs to be debated in colleges and universities in a constructive manner. It should be researched and taught as a subject. Not writing on the subject is detrimental for many reasons. Primarily, a big portion of history is going unrecorded which has great educational value today and for future as well.

Literature and CDs to counter the Taliban propaganda: No books are available in markets or in public libraries with reliable references to counter the emotional propaganda campaign of the Taliban. The Taliban's messages, mostly in the form of CDs, are proliferated some Wahabi (Salafi) Madrassas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab. It is easy to prepare these CDs of with motivational songs in many languages for young audience of the Madrassas. There is not much work done on that front to check the proliferation of this propaganda by the Taliban. Fear of the Taliban prevails in the hearts of religious scholars and prevents them opposing the Taliban openly. Without taking a firm and legitimate position, it is not possible that public support can be garnered in this fight against terrorism. A vigorous drive against this propaganda by the religious scholars, political leaders and public representative is required especially in those areas which are recruiting grounds of suicide attackers in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Category 4: International Community

The fourth category is international community which is mostly non Muslim. It is imperative to present before them true picture of Islam to reduce their anger, fear, anxiety and misunderstandings about ideology of Islam and ideology of Al Qaeda.²⁸ Based on this misunderstanding, the policies like drone attacks and discriminatory treatment of Pakistanis for screening at airports, at passport control and other places adopted by the U.S. government and its allies are doing more harm than good. A research by a radicalization scholar Jean Tillie at the University of Amsterdam proves that some counter terrorism measures may increase the chances of radicalization among the youth. Tillie and Slooman argue that “discrimination can lead individuals to turn away from society and orient themselves on their own group, which provides the safety of a common identity. This is often coupled with a greater emphasis on religion”²⁹. Therefore, feelings of discrimination can reinforce the radicalization process and alienation from the mainstream activities of the society. This view is supported by a research report funded by the Danish Ministry of Justice regarding radicalization processes in Denmark, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.³⁰

It is not a secret that the U.S. now understands that Israel and Palestine issue has direct bearing on its national security.³¹ Terrorists have been using this crisis as a main motivational factor and entice anger among the young Muslims and muster support for their cause. In Iraq and Afghanistan presence of the U.S. forces and Indian occupation of Kashmir is also cited as a reason for the youth to lay their lives through suicide attacks to end this occupation. Ending the sources of discontent and discards will take away the motivation sources from the hands of recruiters and the recruits. International and national media needs to play a positive role in this very vital dimension of prevention of suicide terrorism.

Opportunity

Addressing the motivation behind suicide attacks needs to be accompanied by an institutional response by criminal justice system of Pakistan to deny the opportunities to conduct such attacks and to curtail the operational capacity of terrorists.

Capacity Building of Civilian LEAs: Despite ideological measures, there will be possibility of some elements to find an opportunity to launch suicide attack. Many of the measures mentioned above are reducing the opportunities for terrorists to recruit more terrorists. In order to destroy operational capacity of terrorists, improving the capabilities of civilian LEAs should be the highest priority. At the moment, Pakistani LEAs are ill equipped, poorly trained and insufficient in numbers to meet the challenge. Though the officers at individual level are trying their best but these efforts need to be part of a plan for structural changes. Not only there is need of quantitative improvement but it is also critical to make LEAs politically neutral, functionally independent and responsible for establishing the rule of law.

Technical knowledge about material used for suicide attacks should be available to all LEAs and sale and purchase of these materials should be regulated. Basic laws to check the misuse of microphones in the mosques, spread of hate material, illegal sale and purchase of cell phones should be implemented in letter and spirit. Such small but important steps can limit the operational means of terrorists and reduce their operational capacity.

Data collection, intelligence gathering and sharing and analysis of information should be prime areas to focus on immediately. The Punjab government has started a program to retrain the serving police force by Pakistan Military. It is very positive development but there is need to train senior and junior police officers in intelligence collection and recording. Pakistan Military Intelligence and Inter Services

Intelligence agency can play a very vital role in this aspect. This will promote cooperation among the civilian and military law enforcement agencies without militarization of police because after certain period Police can develop its own intelligence courses in police training schools and in National Police Academy, Islamabad.

Physical surveillance of suspected terrorists and cyber surveillance of internet traffic is very critical because it is an area in which Pakistani LEAs are not very active and advance. In the meantime, internet café should be checked regularly to develop liaison with management of such cafés and keeping the identification of users. Lack of availability of forensics labs and other technical investigation equipment are oft cited problems of LEAs which hamper the institutional response to terrorism. Traditionally, the new tasks added to LEAs responsibilities are not matched by allocation of resources to discharge new responsibilities which makes most of the new initiatives merely a verbal commitment by the commanders.

Visible and Fair Trials by Courts: Present judiciary in Pakistan is a beacon of light for many reasons. A journalist who worked in Indonesia asked me why Pakistani authorities were not arresting then transparently putting terrorists on trial.³² He referred to Media coverage of the trials of the Bali bombers that helped in convince Indonesians to dampen conspiracy theories of the involvement of the CIA or Mossad. The trials were watched by all and sundry and were helpful in understanding what the accused were professing in front of cameras and how logically and legally prosecutor countered their arguments. In another case, a notorious criminal was killed in a shoot out and Indonesian media gave it proper coverage exposing his criminal conduct and history.³³

Recently special anti terrorist courts of Sargodha Division sentenced death penalty to 3 terrorists who were involved in killing 8 police officers and blasting 2 police check posts in district Mianwali of Punjab.³⁴ The news was covered by the media but positive role of investigation, prosecution and judiciary was not noticed at larger scale. This is just a case of excellent counter terrorism efforts which went unnoticed without much applause for the unsung heroes. Fair trial and due process of law should be followed to achieve best results. This transparent exposure has double advantage: educating people and creating deterrence for followers of extremists.

Focus on Prisons: Arresting the suspect terrorists, prosecuting and forgetting them in prison do not end the story. Along with Police, there is also need to improve the rehabilitation environment in the prisons. The terrorists find prisons a niche where they can propagate their views and recruit more followers among the prison population. In Pakistan, it is common knowledge that bad company leads people to crime and terrorism and this opinion is shared by experts in the UK.³⁵ "Two officials of the U.S. confirmed to ABC News that the number of released detainees suspected of or confirmed to have returned to terrorist activities has risen to 20 percent up from the 14 percent recidivism rate in spring 2009".³⁶ More important than choosing between two policies of isolation or integration of the terrorists, in any case, is training prison administrators to look at terrorist prisoners as individuals and tailor prison programs to their needs.³⁷ Proper ideological surveillance should be started in prisons to extract more information about future plans of the terrorists. It is recommended that when offenders are released from the prisons, they should be not sent into the society unaided. Some prisons in the U.S. provide useful skills to assist the criminals in assimilating themselves in the society after ending the incarceration.³⁸ It may require vocational training in the prisons for some useful work, or some micro

finance schemes should be adapted to the released people so they can stand on their feet if they are looking for some social support.³⁹

Operational Capacity

There are two ways to combat with terrorists. One is giving them lesser chances to operate tactically and adopt fool proof procedures to check their activities as discussed above. Other is enhancing the capacity of state which will result in comparative strategic supremacy over all terrorists and state comes out master of the situation.

Good Governance and Rule of Law: Most of the training schools of suicide attackers are based in FATA.⁴⁰ Establishing writ of the government, providing basic services like education, health, employment and security is essence of governance by the state.⁴¹ Body count has never been the criteria of success by any standard in any battlefield. The supply and demand of suicide attackers will not be mitigated if the production houses remain open in FATA. A combination of hard and soft policies is required to eliminate these schools and government needs to prevail in these areas just like District Swat. A military operation in District Swat of Khyber Pakhtun khwa province has resulted in establishing the authority of the government followed by full functioning of state institutions. This is not an easy or quickly achievable task for FATA. However, expansion of government authorities over the whole territory of the country is fundamental duty of a sovereign state.

Regulation of religious matters which includes but not limited to use of loud speakers to building of mosques and Madrassas, needs attention. Nominal presence of federal bodies to monitor the religious affairs is not enough. State authorities should enforce the laws in letter and spirit and ensure that religious narrative are not used to foment public sentiments against state policies by some religious scholars which have wider implications for security and solidarity of the country. This is not an easy task but it is sine qua non for preventing any anti state and violent sentiment in the public emanating from the pulpit for narrow local, political or monitory gains by few individuals who profess to represent the religion.

Trust Building is a two way process. In under developed countries like Pakistan, state has lot of control and people need help from the state. People trust the government if they are recipients of good services from the state institutions. If service delivery by state institutions is poor then it will be difficult to get the public support for any governmental effort to prevent suicide attacks. By the positive role of institutions like police, justice, revenue, health, education and many others, it is easy to win the support of the public. The political leadership should understand the sensitivity of the subject and apolitical and joint approach should be adopted to check the growing radicalization in the society.

Above mentioned policies are not very expensive but dedicated execution of these policies by state institutions is real challenge. Pakistan's institutional history has few examples, if any, of successful execution of national or international policies. Implementation of this strategy depends upon developing, maintaining and if required, expanding the means required to execute its objectives. It will require a broad consensus and partnership among different local, provincial and federal departments. It may also be hampered by budget constraints. To overcome these implementation requirements and providing leadership at district level to top level is real challenge for the state. Sacrificing immediate political gains to appease the allies for ensuring justice and service delivery by the state department will

be minimum requirement. To establish the rule of law is a fundamental requirement of good governance and it is highly desired in Pakistan today.

Conclusion

Religion is a powerful instrument to motive recruit suicide attackers for the terrorist activities. Discriminatory anti terrorism strategies of international community and political issues of Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq are also fomenting radicalization in Pakistan. To prevent suicide attacks there is need to convince the people about fallacy of the teachings of terrorist organizations. A robust criminal justice system is imperative to prevent the growth of suicide attacks. It is responsibility of the state to get control of the troubled areas like FATA and Khyber Pakhtun Khwa. Public participation is important in this strategy and it can only be ensured by good governance and social justice dispensed by the state. However, the effort to employ soft policies should not be seen primarily as a means to curb possible negative effects of counterterrorism measures, but is rather justified by the belief that such measures in combination with hard options are effective tools in preventing extremists to turn into terrorists.⁴²

Terrorist and counterterrorist strategies have reached at such a stage where conventional geographical boundaries are blurred. Technology has given an edge to the U.S. policy makers to use drones while sitting in Virginia but technology has also helped young educated naturalized American citizens like Faisal Shahzad to attempt an attack in Time Square on May, 1 2010.⁴³ “David Headley, the American son of a former Pakistani diplomat, has pleaded guilty before a court in the United States to surveying targets for the Pakistani militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba ahead of Mumbai attacks in 2008”.⁴⁴ Any profiling may not be useful because internet has made it easier for people sitting in Virginia to get inspiration from a radical and extremist school of thought in any other part of the world and they may not necessarily come from specific countries.⁴⁵ Developed countries like the U.S., the UK, Germany or France have infrastructure and capacity to monitor the internet traffic. In most of the countries that are target of terrorism like Pakistan, Iraq or Afghanistan, there is no credible mechanism available to check self radicalization process. In the absence of capable institutions and will to regulate and monitor the religious affairs, it is not hard to predict that situation will be slipping out of the hands in Pakistan.



KNOWLEDGE FOR PEACE

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- ⁵ Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was killed by a LTTE female suicide bomber in 1989
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- ⁷ September 11, 2001
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²² I was head of District Mianwali Police , February-August 2009

²³ To recollect from 2004, registration of foreigners in tribal areas was the bone of contention between tribal leaders like Naik Muhammad and government which resulted in death of Nek Muhammad by a drone attack and paving the way for Baitullah Mehsud to become leader of TTP. Lessons should have been learnt and actual data should have been collected, analyzed and updated.

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²⁵ Wike, Richard, Associate Director, and Holzwart, Kathleen, Research Analyst, Pew Global Attitudes Project, March 12, 2009. The March 3rd attack on the visiting Sri Lankan national cricket team in Lahore was the latest in a series of [troubling headlines from Pakistan](#), where extremist groups are increasingly demonstrating their ability to strike throughout the country. In September 2008, a Marriott hotel in Islamabad, the nation's capital, was bombed, killing more than 50 people, and overall there have been approximately 60 suicide bombings in Pakistan in each of the last two years of 2007 and 2008. <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1148/pakistan-little-support-for-terrorists-most-favor-education-for-girls>

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³² Personal communication with Chris Brummit, Associated Press, Pakistan,; Rahimullah Yousufzai also makes the similar case in Pakistani Scenario 'How Indonesia tackles terrorism' The News, 16 March, 2010 http://www.thenews.com.pk/editorial_detail.asp?id=229257

³³ Yousufzai, Rahimullah 'How Indonesia tackles terrorism' The News, 16 March, 2010 http://www.thenews.com.pk/editorial_detail.asp?id=229257 Rahimullah Yusufzai

³⁴ The News, 'Three terrorists convicted of blowing up four check posts', 5 May, 2010 , Anti-Terrorism Court Judge Mian Anwar Nazeer on Tuesday awarded death on 32 counts, 541-year imprisonment and Rs 5.9 million fine to three terrorists for attacking and blowing up four police check-posts in Mianwali. The prosecution said terrorists Abdullah Ghazali, Abdul Hai and Saleem Zaman had attacked Qudratabad check post with explosives and hand grenades, killing policemen Sher Khan, Bahadur Khan, Sajawal Khan, Ghulam Shabbir, Zafar Iqbal, Ghulam Abbas, Yasir Arafat and Muhammad Ilyas on February 7, 2009. http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=237640

³⁵ Hannah, Greg and Clutterbuck, Lindsay and Rubin, Jennifer Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners, RAND Corporation Report, 2008

³⁶ Martinez, Luis ,ABC News, 6 January 2010, <http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2010/01/gitmo-conviction-rate-rises-to-20-percent-confirmed-to-abc.html>

³⁷ ICG,; [Deradicalisation and Indonesian Prisons](#) , 19 November 2007

³⁸ Western, Bruce 'Reentry' Reversing mass imprisonment, June-August 2008 <http://bostonreview.net/BR33.4/western.php>

³⁹ Saudi Arabia's Deradicalization program offers financial support to graduates of the program.

⁴⁰ Interviews with attempted suicide attackers and an accused in Benazir Bhutto case, Aitzaz Shah at Dera Ismail Khan 19 January, 2008, Attempted suicide attacker Shehbaz Ali Khalid at District Mianwali, June, 2009

⁴¹ Cordesman, Anthony H. 'Analyzing the Afghan War' 7/28/08 Page 10

acordesman@gmail.com http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/080728_afghan_analysis.pdf

⁴² Mapping counterterrorism, A categorization of policies and the promise of empirically-based, systematic comparisons, Deliverable 11, Work package 6 'Citizens and governance in a knowledge-based society' 17 June 2008 www.transnationalterrorism.eu; also Assaf Mughadam .

⁴³ Kornblut, Anne E. and Markon, Jerry and Hsu, Spencer S. 'Pakistani native arrested in Time Square Bomb case'

⁴⁴ Ali, Lihaz ' Irrisistable lure of Pakistan as nursery of global jihad'

⁴⁵ Stern, Jessica says, "After all, we have some idea of what he'll be like: young, socially alienated and deeply religious. And he'll come from a country like Afghanistan, Algeria, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria or Yemen. (Under new Transportation Security Administration rules announced last weekend, people bearing passports from these 14 countries will undergo special scrutiny before boarding a plane.) Or will he? What if he comes from Northern Virginia, like the five young men who were arrested in Pakistan on Dec. 8 and who have been accused of planning "terrorist activities," according to Pakistani newspaper reports".

