

POVERTY AND MILITANCY

Safiya Aftab

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Abstract

The paper examines the possible links between incidence of poverty, and radicalization, or the growth of militancy. It examines the limited available literature on the causes of radicalization, with particular emphasis on the linkages between income and likelihood of joining a militant organization. It goes on to look at the spatial distribution of poverty in Pakistan, and concludes that the data on spatial distribution of poverty does not suggest that poverty is confined to, or is even more intense than the norm, in areas now characterized by intense militant activity. There is little evidence to support the contention that poverty, in and of itself, fuels extremism. Studies on the socio-economic profiles of militants would suggest, however, that poverty is a contributing factor pushing people towards militancy, provided an enabling environment already exists.

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Introduction

Pakistan's body politic began to assume a right-wing orientation in the late 1970s after the military coup of General Zia-ul-Haq. The new government's key policy was the launch of a campaign of "Islamization" which extended to laws, administration (the induction of mosque imams into regular government service for example), controls on the arts and culture, the introduction of new instruments in the financial sector, and to the revision of curricula. Perhaps as a result, Pakistani society undoubtedly moved towards becoming more conservative in terms of the public practice of social and cultural mores over the last three decades. Although this societal shift presaged growing intolerance of any but the strictest interpretations of religion as practiced by a particular sect, it did not, for the most part, manifest itself in violence.

The past six years, however, have witnessed a significant rise in incidents of terrorism perpetrated by extremist organizations, including bombings at government installations, public places and houses of worship; targeted assassinations; and incidents of kidnapping for ransom.¹ More recently, the state is threatened by the rise of militant groups of a variety of hues who have again and again challenged the government's writ, and whose influence is no longer confined to remote tribal areas.

The rise of extremism and militancy in Pakistan is almost unprecedented.² This is not only in terms of the speed at which militancy has spread, particularly in the province of NWFP, but also in terms of the level of organization of the concerned groups, who have succeeded in establishing parallel systems of government across large swathes of territory in tribal areas in particular. However, scholarship into the causes of extremism is only just taking root, and there is little understanding of the drivers of extremism among researchers, analysts and policy makers. Among the possible causes that are talked about in public forums, poverty and poor social indicators figure fairly high on the list. This paper is an attempt to explore this possible nexus with the limited data and literature available.

Literature Review

Literature on the causes of militancy is limited, and largely restricted to newspaper articles and opinion pieces. Nevertheless, the few academic attempts to analyze causes, or to assess possible links between extremism and economic factors throw up some interesting results.³

Robert Kemp, in his paper on extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Kemp, 2008), postulates that the rise of radicalism in Afghanistan and the Pakhtun tribal areas of Pakistan is rooted in the disintegration of tribal (in both countries) and state (mainly in Afghanistan, but increasingly in Pakistan) structures; and the increased influence of religiously orthodox foreign elements who assumed prominence during the long drawn out conflict in Afghanistan. The paper acknowledges that the current insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan has complex local roots, and is fed by poverty and unemployment among other factors, but it does not analyze the extent to which these two factors may have contributed to the influence of orthodox “foreign elements.”

While Kemp’s paper is more “macro” level, an interesting set of studies attempts a more “micro” approach wherein data is collected on members of militant organizations, or other young men who have taken up arms or joined extremist organizations. Sohail Abbas used his experience as a psychologist for such research in a recently published book (Abbas, 2007). Abbas based his research on a survey of 517 men, who were held in Haripur and Peshawar jails respectively upon their re-entry to Pakistan following the overthrow of the Taliban in October 2001. Abbas developed a psycho-sociological profile of his subjects, and compared them to a matchable “control” group which had not joined the war in Afghanistan, but consisted of men of similar socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds to the *jihadis*. It is important to point out here though that Abbas’s sample consisted entirely of those who had gone to fight the war against the US in Afghanistan, and there is no evidence to suggest that these people had carried out acts of terrorism in either Afghanistan or Pakistan before or since. Nevertheless, the data gives an interesting insight into the mindset of people who are likely to be attracted to extremist organizations.

In addition to demographic and psychological profiles of his subjects, Abbas also collected a range of information on their socio-economic backgrounds. Although his sample was small, his findings were telling. He concluded that the *jihadis* were drawn largely from mainstream Pakistani society. They were, for the most part, not educated in

madrassas but in public schools; their literacy level (as a group) was higher than the average for Pakistan. Data on occupations of the *jihadis* showed that in the Haripur sample, only 13.1 percent had been unemployed when they left for Afghanistan, while 30.3 percent worked as laborers, 18.2 percent were students, 14.1 percent worked as tenant farmers, 10.1 percent were small businessmen or shopkeepers while the rest worked in services or as skilled labor. The Peshawar sample yielded a slightly different profile in that the rate of unemployment amongst the group was almost nil. Instead, the largest group (33.8 percent) consisted of tenant farmers, 24.2 had worked as laborers, while skilled labor and students were equally represented at about 17 percent each. Interestingly, the proportion of businessmen in the Peshawar group was very low at only 3.5 percent of the sample. Thus the data does not conform to the commonly held precept that it is primarily the unemployed who are likely to join *jihadi* groups.

The same study also collected data on average income levels. In the Haripur sample, a staggering 35.7 percent reported having no income of their own. Ninety percent of the respondents from Haripur had incomes of less than \$1000 (or Rs. 60,000 at exchange rates for that time) a year, and 75 percent had incomes of less than \$500 (or Rs. 30,000) a year. More or less the same proportions held for the Peshawar sample, although the percentage of respondents who reported having no income was smaller in this group at 26.3 percent. Thus almost all the respondents belonged to the bottom two or three income quintiles in Pakistan in terms of their individual earnings. Nevertheless, most of them were employed in some form, and those who reported having no income of their own were presumably supported in a joint family system. The survey did not have further data on this latter large group, and there was no information on the average income of the families that these people belonged to. In fact, the survey question was worded such that it asked for the income of the respondent only, and did not further question the respondent on the family's sources of income or socio-economic status. In a society where resources tend to be pooled at the household level, and joint family living is the norm, the income data may not be a very reliable indicator of the respondent's actual economic status.

A more recent study with a similar focus was conducted by Christine Fair, who based her work on a survey of the families of 141 militants most of whom were slain in conflict in the Kashmir valley or in Afghanistan. Fair's study was conducted in 2004-05, and concentrated on families of

militants who had died in the post 1990 era, thus excluding men who had taken part in the conflict with the Soviets in Afghanistan. Given the limited information available, a generalized sample universe pinpointing the location of slain militants could not be created, and the sample picked could be characterized as a “convenience” sample wherein newspaper reports or personal information was used to identify families who had lost a family member to conflict. The sample disproportionately represented the NWFP, with 55 percent of respondent households being picked from that province. A further 26 percent were from Punjab, while 13 percent were from Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). Only 4 percent of respondent households were located in Balochistan, while 2 percent were in Sindh.

As in the case of Abbas’s study, Fair’s work also profiled the socio-economic characteristics of the household of the deceased militants, in addition to collecting a range of information on the household’s religious convictions, support for the militant’s decision to leave for *jihad* etc. Her findings with regard to education were similar to the earlier study in that only 4 percent of the deceased militants were reported to have attended a madrassah full time, and levels of education attained by the group were higher than the average for Pakistan. About 94 percent of the militants had had some form of formal education, with 40 percent having completed high school.

The survey also collected information on the militant’s employment status before he left for the front, and found that 50 percent of the militants did not have jobs in the year before they left. A further 25 percent worked part time, while the remaining 25 percent worked full time. The results were adjusted for the fact that many militants were studying before recruitment and did not enter the workforce at all, but even so, about a quarter of the sample were entirely unemployed in the year before joining the *jihad*. Of those who had worked either part or full time, the paper reports that “several” were highly skilled, but does not provide data on the numbers. Fair’s survey did not collect information on income of the militants or their families, or on assets held by the households.

Shinwari’s recent study on the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) is one of the more comprehensive recent works on the region and provides an excellent historical background of the evolution of systems in administration in the tribal areas (Shinwari, 2008). Shinwari claims that FATA is the most backward region in Pakistan, with 60 percent of the population living below the poverty line. Per capita public expenditure in

the region is, according to his finding, one-third of the average for Pakistan. Employment opportunities are limited, and the main sectors of employment are agriculture, transport, (generally illegal) cross-border trade, small businesses, and arms and drug trafficking. Shinwari sees poverty and lack of opportunity as a contributing factor towards growing militancy in FATA, and advocates “local” solutions – conflict mediation through the traditional *jirga* mechanism, and the strengthening of the fledgling local government system (established in FATA in 2002). The study is primarily a sociological one, and incorporates the results of an extensive survey in the region which questioned the residents on their perception of societal change, and their vision for the region.

The literature on causes of militancy and/or studies profiling militants tend to point to a connection between lack of employment opportunities and the probability of joining a militant organization. Thus poverty and a lack of job prospects may very well be strong contributing factors. But poverty is endemic across Pakistan, and employment prospects are at best highly variable. In the next section, we look at the pattern of poverty incidence in Pakistan.

Poverty Incidence in Pakistan

Estimates of poverty incidence generally come from official sources, requiring, as they do, extensive household income and expenditure surveys which are normally conducted by the Federal Government. Unfortunately, almost all of these surveys, like the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES), which was the standard household survey conducted in the 1990s, and the more recent Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM) which is supposed to monitor the outcomes of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), are conducted only over the settled districts of Pakistan, and not in FATA – a serious omission with respect to this paper. Nevertheless, given that militancy has spilled over beyond the tribal belt, an analysis of data from the settled districts is also not without value.

Federal Government sources, which estimate poverty incidence according to the headcount index, indicate that in 1998-99, 30.6 percent of Pakistanis were living below the poverty line. In 2004-05, poverty incidence was estimated by the Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS) at 23.9 percent, and by 2005-06, this level had apparently dropped to 22.3 percent (EAW, 2008. Table 13.4). The distinction between urban and rural poverty is important

here – rural poverty incidence was estimated at 27 percent in 2005-06 as opposed to urban poverty incidence of only 13.1 percent.

The Federal Government’s poverty estimation methodology has, however, been criticized on a variety of counts including faulty survey design and technique of estimation etc. The World Bank estimated poverty incidence in Pakistan at 28.3 percent in 2004-05 using the official raw data. Nevertheless, the available data does indicate a declining trend in absolute poverty between 1998-99 and 2005-06. More disturbingly, the Gini coefficient, which measures inequality in income distribution was estimated at 0.3 in 2005-06 compared to 0.27 in 2001-02, indicating that in spite of apparent decreases in absolute poverty, inequality had increased over the five year period (EAW 2008, Table 13.6).

Spatial Distribution of Poverty by Province

In terms of spatial distribution, there is limited information on poverty incidence by province since the beginning of this decade, and no official estimation of district level poverty headcounts.⁴ However, in one of the more comprehensive analyses of poverty in Pakistan, the Social Policy Development Center (SPDC), an independent research institution based in Karachi, estimated poverty incidence by province for 2001-02 data from the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) (SPDC, 2004). The key estimates are reproduced in Table 1.⁵

Table 1: Poverty Incidence by Province (Percent)

<i>Province</i>	<i>Overall</i>	<i>Rural</i>	<i>Urban</i>		
			<i>Provincial capital</i>	<i>Large cities</i>	<i>Small cities and towns</i>
Punjab	26	24	18	22	43
Sindh	31	38	10	23	40
NWFP	29	27	28	-	41
Balochistan	48	51	14	-	44

Source: SPDC 2004, Table 3.3.

Thus at the beginning of this decade, which is also the starting point of our period of interest with regard to the rise of militancy in Pakistan, overall poverty incidence was highest in Balochistan, where almost half of the population was estimated to live below the poverty line. The difference in poverty incidence in Sindh and NWFP was minimal overall, but Sindh data tends to be skewed because of the inclusion of data from the mega-city of Karachi in Sindh samples. A more realistic comparison would be to look at data for poverty incidence in rural Sindh and compare it with poverty incidence in rural areas of NWFP. Here, Sindh fared considerably worse with 38 percent of the rural population living under the poverty line compared to 27 percent in NWFP. Punjab was the most prosperous province relatively, with an overall poverty incidence of 26 percent, and, anomalously, rural poverty incidence of just 24 percent.⁶

The 2001-02 data was also analyzed at the Center for Research on Poverty Reduction and Income Distribution (CRPRID), which looked at trends in the headcount measure of poverty incidence across all the provinces from 1992-93 to 2001-02 (Cheema, 2005). The CRPRID estimates differed significantly from those of SPDC, and showed that NWFP had the highest incidence of poverty of all the provinces in Pakistan in 2001-02 at 41.5 percent. Poverty incidence in Sindh and Balochistan was estimated to be almost equal at about 35 percent, while the incidence in Punjab was the lowest at 32 percent. Poverty incidence had, however, significantly increased in all provinces between 1992-93 to 2001-02, particularly in Sindh and Balochistan which had been ravaged by a drought from 1999 to 2002.

There are key differences in methodology of poverty estimation between the SPDC and CRPRID studies, the discussion of which would be beyond the scope of this paper. Broadly though, a review of both studies suggests that Punjab and urban Sindh have the lowest poverty incidence in Pakistan, while NWFP and Balochistan have relatively high poverty levels. Furthermore, poverty was steadily on the increase throughout the 1990s, with the effects of the drought becoming strongly apparent in parts of Sindh and Balochistan in the early years of the current decade.

While the above two studies measured poverty levels at the provincial level, the Pakistan National Human Development Report prepared by UNDP in 2003 attempted to rank provinces on the basis of social development using the methodology developed for the preparation of the UNDP's cross country Human Development Index (see Hussain et. al., 2003). Thus the HDI is constructed on the basis of literacy and enrolment

ratios in an area, in addition to infant mortality and immunization rates and real GDP per capita. The report developed two broad rankings, one for provincial urban and rural areas, and the other for individual districts. Overall, Punjab ranked highest on the human development index, followed by Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan. When the provinces were further disaggregated by urban and rural areas, however, urban Sindh ranked at the top, while rural Sindh fell to the bottom of the list. Table 2 reproduces the index.

Table 2: Human Development Index for Pakistan – Province Rankings

<i>Province</i>	<i>HDI*</i>	<i>Rank</i>
Overall province		
Punjab	0.557	1
Sindh	0.540	2
NWFP	0.510	3
Balochistan	0.499	4
Rural and Urban Areas		
Sindh (Urban)	0.659	1
Punjab (Urban)	0.657	2
NWFP (Urban)	0.627	3
Balochistan (Urban)	0.591	4
Punjab (Rural)	0.517	5
NWFP (Rural)	0.489	6
Balochistan (Rural)	0.486	7
Sindh (Rural)	0.456	8

Source: Hussain, 2003. Table 4.

* The HDI scale varies from 0 to 1, with 1 being the maximum level of human development.

The above result is somewhat counter-intuitive, and serves to highlight the disparity in urban and rural development in the Sindh province. It also points to the gap between NWFP and Balochistan on the one hand and Punjab on the other – while urban Sindh and urban Punjab had similar rankings, NWFP lagged by about 30 basis points in terms of both urban and rural human development.

District Rankings

The NHDR also carried a more detailed HDI ranking of districts, reproduced in Annex I. The ranking covered 91 settled districts in all four provinces of Pakistan, and shows some fairly clear patterns. For example, almost 60 percent of the districts featuring in the top one-third of ranked districts lay in the province of Punjab, while 19 percent were in NWFP. Of the bottom one third districts, 47 percent lay in Balochistan while 34 percent lay in NWFP, while no district from Punjab was ranked in the last one-third of districts. Across provinces, inter-district disparity was highest in Balochistan, followed by NWFP.

A comprehensive study on food security in rural Pakistan conducted by the World Food Program (WFP) in 2003 also provides valuable insight into sub-national poverty incidence (WFP/SDPI 2003). The study was based on an analysis of secondary data, and assessed food availability, economic access to food and food absorption in rural areas of all districts of Pakistan, including districts in FATA. The findings of the study were alarming in that rural areas of 62 percent of the 120 districts assessed were found to be food insecure in terms of insufficient availability and limited economic access to food, while 38 percent of districts had poor rates of food absorption, pointing to the widespread prevalence of nutritional insecurity even when food is available. The report also found that 65 percent of districts in Sindh were food insecure, while in Punjab this figure was significantly lower at 29 percent. The situation in NWFP and Balochistan was perilous, with 88 percent of all districts in NWFP, and 85 percent in Balochistan being food insecure. In FATA, the level of food insecurity was extreme in that all seven agencies comprising the tribal areas were judged to be food insecure.

The study's estimates of caloric poverty in rural Pakistan are reproduced in Annex II. In terms of intensity of caloric poverty, Balochistan comes out the most intensely food insecure province, with caloric poverty in the rural area of Dera Bugti assessed at 73 percent – the highest for any district of Pakistan. Of the 27 districts of Balochistan, 23 had caloric

poverty incidence of over 40 percent in their rural areas. In comparison, only 5 of the 34 districts in Punjab were as intensely poor in terms of caloric poverty, while no district in the settled area of NWFP had caloric poverty incidence of over 40 percent.⁷ In Sindh, 7 out of 17 districts were assessed to have caloric poverty incidence of over 40 percent, with incidence in Tharparkar estimated at 72 percent. The situation in FATA was also fairly serious, with caloric poverty in the two Waziri agencies assessed at close to 49 percent and 46 percent respectively, but this was by no means an unusual circumstance given the prevalence of caloric poverty throughout rural Pakistan according to the study.

Findings

Any attempt to establish a quantitative relationship between the prevalence of poverty and recruitment into militant organizations is precluded by the lack of data on the latter variable - we simply do not have enough information on the numbers joining militant groups, let alone their home district or place of recruitment. Our analysis is therefore restricted to broad brush strokes, based on regional data. Key findings are as follows.

Poverty Clusters Occur Throughout Pakistan: Whether measured in terms of caloric poverty or the HDI, poverty is endemic throughout Pakistan. In general, northern Punjab and urban Sindh boast higher standards of living than the rest of the country, but in terms of poverty incidence, there is little to distinguish between much of NWFP and Balochistan; as well as rural Sindh, southern Punjab, and FATA. In terms of poverty intensity in rural areas, NWFP may actually be faring better than the rest of the country, largely because of the nature of the provincial economy, which is essentially remittance based, and therefore less liable to be affected by the vagaries of the agriculture sector. Similarly, average caloric poverty intensity in FATA was not significantly different from the average in Sindh, and was in fact seven percentage points lower than the average for Balochistan.

Militant Recruitment in High HDI Districts: The studies by Abbas and Fair both point to the existence of active militant organizations in areas such as the environs of Peshawar and Haripur, and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), areas where caloric poverty levels are relatively low, and HDI levels are high.⁸ On the other hand, neither of the studies found significant representation from the province of Balochistan in the groups of militants they interviewed. This is in spite of the fact that Balochistan

has a history of political instability, has witnessed at least three insurgencies against the central government, and has extremely poor socio-economic and poverty indicators. Rural Sindh is similarly under-represented in the samples of both the studies cited in spite of its poor HDI rankings.

Poverty as a Contributing Factor: Although there appears to be little support for the idea that poverty fuels extremism, it does appear to be a contributing factor. Abbas's study, which has fairly detailed data on the socio-economic profiles of militants, suggests that most of them belonged to households whose incomes would lie in the bottom two or three quintiles of household income distribution in Pakistan. Fair's work seems to dispute this, and she mentions the presence of a fairly high number of skilled, middle class people in her sample, but her research also showed that three quarters of her sample consisted of people who were either unemployed or under-employed in the year before joining a militant organization, and were therefore likely to be facing some financial pressure.

The difference in the poverty related findings of the two studies may also point to differences in the nature of the two conflicts in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Fair's work suggests that the conflict in Kashmir required the recruitment of relatively educated persons with a demonstrated ability to pick up new skills. Abbas's sample consisted mostly of young men who had gone, mostly on their own initiative, to join the war in Afghanistan in reaction to the US invasion. Nevertheless, in both cases, it appears that the rank and file of militant organizations consists of persons drawn from the poor or lower-middle income groups. Thus poverty may push disaffected, unemployed young men to join militant organizations when the surrounding socio-cultural milieu is heavily inclined towards such groups and peer pressure is strong.

Public Schooling: The link between low household income and militancy may manifest itself in the form of schooling that the household can provide for. While both Fair (in the study quoted, as well as a paper on militancy and madrassa education – see References) and Abbas found few madrassa alumni in their samples of militants, they also did not encounter any private school graduates. Fair contends in her paper on militancy and madrassas (see Fair, 2007) that the public school system in Pakistan works on the basis of a curriculum that is highly likely to engender intolerance and promote the concept of conflict resolution through violence. Children from low income households who tend to use public services are thus

exposed to a schooling that essentially does not encourage free thinking, inquisitiveness, or tolerance of any sort of difference. Combined with a lack of employment opportunities for the average graduate, this is a combustible mixture in an environment where armed conflict is presented as a religious duty.

Conclusion

As is typical of developing economies and particularly countries in South Asia, widespread poverty and deprivation, and poor social and human development indicators characterize Pakistan's society. While poverty levels tend to fluctuate considerably in the country, particularly in consonance with growth or decline in the agriculture sector, official sources would suggest that poverty, when measured according to the headcount index, decreased in the period between 2001-02 and 2005-06. Nevertheless, this period also witnessed a significant increase in militancy and incidents of terrorism. An analysis of the spatial distribution of poverty does not suggest that poverty is confined to, or is even more intense than the norm, in areas now characterized by intense militant activity. Also, militant recruitment from some particularly poor regions, namely rural Sindh and much of Balochistan, appears to be fairly low. There is thus little evidence to support the contention that poverty, in and of itself, fuels extremism.

Studies on the socio-economic profiles of militants would suggest, however, that poverty is a contributing factor pushing people towards militancy, provided an enabling environment already exists. The lack of employment opportunities for the educated, as well as deficiencies in the public school system also appear amongst the factors that drive militancy.

Notes:

- ¹ The current wave of extremist related unrest started in early 2002 in South Waziristan, when the Pakistan Army moved troops into the Agency in July 2002 for the first time since independence. The conflict became markedly more intense after a strike (carried out either by the Pakistan Army with US complicity, or by an unmanned US aircraft, according to different sources) on a *madrassah* in Bajaur Agency in October 2006 which allegedly killed 80 people, including many children. Thereafter, the Army operation on the Red Mosque in Islamabad in July 2007 added to the ferocity of militant attacks, many of which were allegedly carried out in retribution for the incident.
- ² The two terms are often used interchangeably, as they are inextricably linked in Pakistan's context. However, extremism refers to a rigid, intolerant interpretation of religion, whereas militancy refers to acts of terrorism or challenges to the writ of the state effected by organizations generally run and manned by extremists. Another term, radicalization, which will be used in this paper, refers to the process by which people are drawn towards extremism and eventually, militancy.
- ³ Most of the studies referenced in this section contain information on a range of issues in addition to socio-economic characteristics. However, the literature review concentrates on the socio-economic data collected in the surveys in keeping with the focus of this paper.
- ⁴ The reluctance of the Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS) to share raw data from its household surveys has precluded attempts by independent economists to construct a "poverty map" of Pakistan.
- ⁵ The sample size in the HIES 2001-02 survey was not large enough to prepare robust estimates of poverty incidence by province. The SPDC team therefore used the Small Area Estimation Technique when calculating poverty incidence by province.
- ⁶ The SPDC's results indicated that rural poverty was lower than overall poverty in both Punjab and NWFP, a result that goes against conventional wisdom.
- ⁷ All five Punjab districts with caloric poverty of over 40 percent lay in southern Punjab.
- ⁸ Although HDI figures quoted in this paper do not cover AJK, school enrolment and basic health indicators in the autonomous region are believed to be higher than the national average.

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Annex 1: District Rankings by HDI

<i>District</i>	<i>Province</i>	<i>HDI</i>	<i>Rank</i>
Jhelum	Punjab	0.703	1
Ziarat	Balochistan	0.697	2
Haripur	NWFP	0.629	3
Sheikhupura	Punjab	0.621	4
Karachi	Sindh	0.618	5
Abbottabad	NWFP	0.598	6
Bhakkar	Punjab	0.581	7
Kasur	Punjab	0.577	8
Rawalpindi	Punjab	0.576	9
Khusab	Punjab	0.575	10
Mandi	Punjab	0.568	11
Bahauddin			
Lahore	Punjab	0.558	12
Loralai	Balochistan	0.556	13
Sialkot	Punjab	0.555	14
Chakwal	Punjab	0.545	15
Gujrat	Punjab	0.543	16
Sahiwal	Punjab	0.541	17
Rahim Yar	Punjab	0.541	18
Khan			
Kohat	NWFP	0.537	19
Mianwali	Punjab	0.537	20
Dadu	Sindh	0.535	21
Sargodha	Punjab	0.535	22
Hyderabad	Sindh	0.532	23
Peshawar	NWFP	0.531	24
Gujranwala	Punjab	0.529	25
Nowshera	NWFP	0.529	26
Jhang	Punjab	0.529	27
Mastung	Balochistan	0.528	28
Okara	Punjab	0.528	29
Swabi	NWFP	0.523	30
Mirpur Khas	Sindh	0.522	31
Mardan	NWFP	0.519	32
Lasbela	Balochistan	0.514	33

<i>District</i>	<i>Province</i>	<i>HDI</i>	<i>Rank</i>
Khanewal	Punjab	0.513	34
Kech	Balochistan	0.512	35
Vehari	Punjab	0.508	36
Attock	Punjab	0.507	37
Naushahro Feroze	Sindh	0.506	38
Charsadda	NWFP	0.506	39
Bahawalpur	Punjab	0.501	40
Pakpattan	Punjab	0.498	41
Ghotki	Sindh	0.496	42
Panjgur	Balochistan	0.496	43
Multan	Punjab	0.494	44
Nasirabad	Balochistan	0.492	45
Hafizabad	Punjab	0.486	46
Sukkur	Sindh	0.486	47
Karak	NWFP	0.484	48
Nawab Shah	Sindh	0.481	49
Chitral	NWFP	0.479	50
Lodhran	Punjab	0.475	51
Narowal	Punjab	0.472	52
Dera Ghazi Khan	Punjab	0.471	53
Chagai	Balochistan	0.468	54
Bannu	NWFP	0.465	55
Sanghar	Sindh	0.461	56
Malakand	NWFP	0.461	57
Mansehra	NWFP	0.459	58
Muzaffargarh	Punjab	0.459	59
Badin	Sindh	0.459	60
Killa Saifullah	Balochistan	0.455	61
Jaffarabad	Balochistan	0.454	62
Khairpur	Sindh	0.449	63
Thatta	Sindh	0.447	64
Lakki Marwat	NWFP	0.444	65
Swat	NWFP	0.442	66
Larkana	Sindh	0.435	67
Zhob	Balochistan	0.432	68

<i>District</i>	<i>Province</i>	<i>HDI</i>	<i>Rank</i>
Dera Ismail Khan	NWFP	0.425	69
Buner	NWFP	0.423	70
Barkhan	Balochistan	0.420	71
Shikarpur	Sindh	0.417	72
Lower Dir	NWFP	0.413	73
Kalat	Balochistan	0.412	74
Sibi	Balochistan	0.411	75
Hangu	NWFP	0.400	76
Jacobabad	Sindh	0.393	77
Gwadar	Balochistan	0.392	78
Killa Abdullah	Balochistan	0.387	79
Tank	NWFP	0.384	80
Awaran	Balochistan	0.381	81
Upper Dir	NWFP	0.369	82
Batgram	NWFP	0.363	83
Bolan	Balochistan	0.360	84
Kohlu	Balochistan	0.348	85
Kharan	Balochistan	0.346	86
Jhalmagsi	Balochistan	0.345	87
Tharparkar	Sindh	0.343	88
Kohistan	NWFP	0.332	89
Shangla	NWFP	0.332	90
Dera Bugti	Balochistan	0.285	91

Source: Hussain, et. al. 2003. Table 4(b).

Annex II: Caloric Poverty in Rural Pakistan

Punjab

<i>District</i>	<i>Percent of Poor</i>	<i>Rank</i>
Rajanpur	48.1	1
Muzaffargarh	47.1	2
Dera Ghazi Khan	46.4	3
Multan	46.2	4
Bahawalpur	43.3	5
Layyah	39.7	6
Rahim Yar Khan	39.4	7
Attock	39.1	8
Lahore	38.6	9
Lodhran	37.5	10
Rawalpindi	37.1	11
Khanewal	37.0	12
Mianwali	36.7	13
Gujrat	36.5	14
Jhang	36.1	15
Chakwal	35.7	16
Narowal	35.5	17
Khushab	35.3	18
Vehari	34.1	19
Bhakkar	34.0	20
Kasur	33.8	21
Bahawalnagar	33.8	22
Sahiwal	33.6	23
Gujranwala	33.5	24
Pakpattan	33.2	25

<i>District</i>	<i>Percent of Poor</i>	<i>Rank</i>
Okara	32.4	26
Sialkot	32.2	27
Faisalabad	32.1	28
Hafizabad	31.9	29
Sheikhupura	31.8	30
Sargodha	31.4	31
Toba Tek Singh	31.1	32
Jhelum	30.8	33
Mandi Bahauddin	30.6	34

Sindh

<i>District</i>	<i>Percent of Poor</i>	<i>Rank</i>
Tharparkar	72.4	1
Umerkot	46.2	2
Jacobabad	45.0	3
Sukkur	44.4	4
Khairpur	42.9	5
Ghotki	41.1	6
Thatta	40.7	7
Sanghar	38.6	8
Dadu	37.8	9
Mirpurkhas	37.6	10
Larkana	37.2	11
Shikarpur	36.2	12
Hyderabad	34.0	13
Badin	33.9	14
Karachi	33.2	15
Noushero Feroze	32.6	16

Nawabshah	32.0	17
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NWFP

<i>District</i>	<i>Percent of Poor</i>	<i>Rank</i>
Shangla	37.4	1
Kohistan	37.3	2
Hangu	36.2	3
Upper Dir	33.8	4
Batgram	31.4	5
Swat	29.1	6
Bannu	28.0	7
Tank	27.6	8
Chitral	27.4	9
Buner	27.3	10
Lower Dir	27.1	11
Karak	26.4	12
Mansehra	25.9	13
Nowshera	25.8	14
Lakki	25.7	15
Mardan	24.7	16
Kohat	24.5	17
Dera Ismail Khan	24.4	18
Swabi	24.3	19
Charsadda	23.8	20
Malakand	23.0	21
Peshawar	21.3	22
Haripur	19.9	23
Abbotabad	17.8	24

Balochistan

<i>District</i>	<i>Percent of Poor</i>	<i>Rank</i>
Dera Bugti	73.0	1
Musakhel	68.9	2
Kharan	68.6	3
Bolan	62.2	4
Kohlu	57.1	5
Zhob	56.8	6
Khuzdar	56.6	7
Awaran	53.9	8
Kila Abdullah	52.7	9
Jhal Magsi	51.5	10
Barkhan	51.5	11
Kila Saifullah	49.7	12
Kalat	49.6	13
Sibi	48.9	14
Chaghi	47.8	15
Panjgur	46.7	16
Turbat	46.6	17
Lasbela	46.2	18
Gawadar	45.0	19
Mastung	43.1	20
Pishin	42.7	21
Loralai	41.8	22
Jafarabad	36.8	23
Quetta	35.9	24
Nasirabad	30.3	25
Zhob	27.7	26

Northern Areas

<i>District</i>	<i>Percent of Poor</i>	<i>Rank</i>
Diamer	46.2	1
Skardu	40.9	2
Ghanche	40.4	3
Ghizer	35.1	4
Gilgit	32.5	5

Azad Jammu and Kashmir

<i>District</i>	<i>Percent of Poor</i>	<i>Rank</i>
Muzaffarabad	33.7	1
Bhimber	30.0	2
Bagh	28.7	3
Kotli	28.6	4
Sudhnoti	26.9	5
Rawalakot	26.2	6
Mirpur	24.6	7

Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA)

<i>District</i>	<i>Percent of Poor</i>	<i>Rank</i>
North Waziristan	48.8	1
South Waziristan	46.3	2
Khyber	41.3	3
Kurram	41.0	4
Mohmand	40.9	5
Orakzai	39.3	6
Bajaur	38.5	7

Source: WFP/SDPI, 2003. Table 6.5